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ESSAY
LEGAL PERSONHOOD FOR ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCES
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM*
Could an artificial intelligence become a legal person? As of today,
this question is only theoretical. No existing computer program cur-
rently possesses the sort of capacities that would justify serious judicial
inquiry into the question of legal personhood. The question is nonethe-
less of some interest. Cognitive science begins with the assumption that
the nature of human intelligence is computational, and therefore, that the
human mind can, in principle, be modelled as a program that runs on a
computer.' Artificial intelligence (Al) research attempts to develop such
models.2 But even as cognitive science, has displaced behavioralism as
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Loyola Mary-
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Law School. I owe thanks to Scott Altman, Ken Anderson, Don Brosnan, Don Crenshaw,
Zlatan Damnjanovic, Michael Fitts, Kent Greenawalt, Sharon Lloyd, Shelley Marks, David
Milon, Elyn Saks, and Paul Weithman for comments made on earlier versions of this essay.
My colleagues Dave Leonard, Sam Pillsbury, Dave Tunick, and Peter Tiersma have been gen-
erous in sharing criticisms and suggestions. Bill Mulherin of the William M. Rains Law Li-
brary and Jai Gohel of the Loyola Law School Class of 1992 provided valuable research
assistance. Finally, I am grateful to the editors of this review for their many helpful
suggestions.
1. For an introduction to cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, see OWEN J.
FLANAGAN, JR., THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND 1-22 (2d ed. 1991). For the purposes of this
essay, I will not address the question as to which computer architectures could produce artifi-
cial intelligence. For example I will not discuss the question whether parallel, as opposed to
serial, processing would be required. Similarly, I will not discuss the merits of connectionist as
opposed to traditional approaches to AL. For a comparison of parallel distributed processing
with serial processing, see id. at 224-41. These issues are moot in one sense. A digital com-
puter can, in principle, implement any connectionist or parallel approach. On the other hand,
there could be one very important practical difference: the parallel architecture could turn out
to be much faster.
2. There is a debate within the artificial intelligence community as to the goal of AI
research. The possibilities range from simply making machines smarter to investigating the
nature of human intelligence or, more broadly, the nature of all intelligence. See Bob Ryan,
AI's Identity Crisis, BYTE, Jan. 1991, at 239, 239-40. Owen Flanagan distinguishes four pro-
grams of AI research. Nonpsychological AI research involves building and programming
computers to accomplish tasks that would require intelligence if undertaken by humans.
Weak psychological Al views computer models as a tool for investigating human intelligence.
Strong psychological Al assumes that human minds really are computers and therefore in
principle can be duplicated by Al research. Suprapsychological AI investigates the nature of
all intelligence and hence is not limited to investigating the human mind. See FLANAGAN,
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the dominant paradigm for investigating the human mind, fundamental
questions about the very possibility of artificial intelligence continue to be
debated. This Essay explores those questions through a series of thought
experiments that transform the theoretical question whether artificial in-
telligence is possible into legal questions such as, "Could an artificial in-
telligence serve as a trustee?"
What is the relevance of these legal thought experiments for the de-
bate over the possibility of artificial intelligence? A preliminary answer
to this question has two parts. First, putting the AI debate in a concrete
legal context acts as a pragmatic Occam's razor. By reexamining posi-
tions taken in cognitive science or the philosophy of artificial intelligence
as legal arguments, we are forced to see them anew in a relentlessly prag-
matic context.3 Philosophical claims that no program running on a digi-
tal computer could really be intelligent are put into a context that
requires us to take a hard look at just what practical importance the
missing reality could have for the way we speak and conduct our affairs.
In other words, the legal context provides a way to ask for the "cash
value" of the arguments. The hypothesis developed in this Essay is that
only some of the claims made in the debate over the possibility of AI do
make a pragmatic difference, and it is pragmatic differences that ought to
be decisive.4
Second, and more controversially, we can view the legal system as a
repository of knowledge-a formal accumulation of practical judg-
ments.' The law embodies core insights about the way the world works
supra note 1, at 241-42. This Essay discusses the philosophical foundations for Flanagan's
third and fourth categories of AI research.
3. See generally Catharine W. Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual
Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 541, 561-75,
595-99 (1988) (discussing Holmes's jurisprudential focus on concrete issues rather than gener-
alities); Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 409-12 (1990) (dis-
cussing the renewed popularity of legal pragmatism); Symposium: The Renaissance of
Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990) (collecting articles
espousing diverse views of legal pragmatism). The law is a "pragmatic" context in the sense
that legal decisions are made for practical purposes with consequences in mind and in the sense
that foundationalist philosophical theories do not play a role in legal reasoning. This assertion
does not depend on the further claim that legal actors have adopted American pragmatism as
part of their world view.
4. In addition, the Essay advances a more modest hypothesis. Examining the debate
over the possibility of Al through legal examples illuminates the consequences of the argu-
ments made in the debate, and this pragmatic assessment has a bearing on the arguments, even
if it is not decisive. This Essay surely does not suffice to confirm the ambitious hypothesis in
the text. I hope that it has established the more modest claim presented in this footnote. The
proof, of course, is in the pudding.
5. The point is related to that made by Sir John Fortescue about the common law of
England. There is a presumption in favor of its wisdom, because it has been tested by long
experience. See SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE 39-41 (S.B. Chrimes
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and how we evaluate it. Moreover, in common-law systems judges strive
to decide particular cases in a way that best fits the legal landscape-the
prior cases, the statutory law, and the constitution.6 Hence, transform-
ing the abstract debate over the possibility of AI into an imagined hard
case forces us to check our intuitions and arguments against the assump-
tions that underlie social decisions made in many other contexts. By us-
ing a thought experiment that explicitly focuses on wide coherence,7 we
increase the chance that the positions we eventually adopt will be in re-
flective equilibrium' with our views about related matters. In addition,
the law embodies practical knowledge in a form that is subject to public
examination and discussion. Legal materials are published and subject to
widespread public scrutiny and discussion. Some of the insights gleaned
in the law may clarify our approach to the artificial intelligence debate.9
I do not claim in this Essay to have resolved the debate over the
possibility of artificial intelligence. My aim is more modest: I am pro-
posing a way of thinking about the debate that just might result in pro-
gress. There is some precedent for this project. Christopher Stone
brought questions of environmental ethics into focus by asking whether
trees should have standing."0 My hope is that the law will be equally
ed., Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons 1986) (1537); see also J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADI-
TION 9-18 (1975) (offering a critique of Fortescue's laudatory expositions of English law and
arguing that because English law is based on accumulated experiences-elevated to the level of
custom-its very existence presumes its validity, thus preempting rational scrutiny of English
law's assumption that it is well suited to the needs of the English).
6. Here I adopt the view of Ronald Dworkin. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
91-96, 147-50, 276-400 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 3-42 (1985);
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 1-80 (1977).
7. Cf SUSAN L. HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS 15-18, 225-53 (1987) (advocating coher-
ence approach to reasoning in general and legal reasoning in particular); S.L. Hurley, Coher-
ence, Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 221, 222-32 (1990)
(same, with emphasis on legal reasoning).
8. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1971).
9. I say "may provide" advisedly. We must be on guard against an easy or unthinking
move from a legal conclusion to a moral one. In many circumstances, there are good reasons
for answering a moral question differently from a legal one. Most obviously, the costs of legal
enforcement of a norm are quite different than the costs of social enforcement of a moral norm.
Moreover, in many cases, the law will simply be morally wrong. The fact that a legal rule has
survived a very long time does tell us that it has not led to the collapse of the society that
enforces it, but it does not tell us directly whether that society would be better off without it.
The legal case may bear on the moral one, but not being irrelevant is far from being decisive. I
owe thanks to Elyn Saks for prompting me to qualify my argument in this regard.
10. See Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natu-
ral Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450, 453-57 (1972) [hereinafter Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing?]. So far as I know, Stone became the first legal thinker to raise the questions asked
by this Essay in a footnote to his famous 1972 essay. See id. at 456 n.26 (raising the question
as to whether analysis applicable to natural objects such as trees would be appropriate to
19921 1233
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fruitful as a context in which to think about the possibility of AI. The
"artificial reason and judgment of law"I1 may circumvent the intractable
intuitions that threaten to lock the AI debate in dialectical impasse.
Part I of this Essay recounts some recent developments in cognitive
science and explores the debate as to whether artificial intelligence is pos-
sible. Part II puts the question in legal perspective by setting out the
notion of legal personhood. Parts III and IV explore two hypothetical
scenarios. Part III examines the first scenario-an attempt to appoint an
Al as a trustee. The second scenario, an AI's invocation of the individ-
ual rights provisions of the United States Constitution, is the subject of
Part IV. The results are then brought to bear on the debate over the
possibility of artificial intelligence in Part V. In conclusion, Part VI
takes up the question whether cognitive science might have implications
for current legal and moral debates over the meaning of personhood.
I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Is artificial intelligence possible? The debate over this question has
its roots at the very beginning of modem thought about the nature of the
human mind. It was Thomas Hobbes who first proposed a computa-
tional theory of mind: "By ratiocination, I mean computation."12 And
it was Rene Descartes who first considered a version of the question
whether it would be possible for a machine to think:
For we can easily understand a machine's being constituted so
that it can utter words, and even emit some responses to action
on it of a corporeal kind, which brings about a change in its
organs; for example, if it is touched in a particular part it may
ask what we wish to say to it; if in another part it may exclaim
that it is being hurt, and so on, but it never happens that it
arranges its speech in various ways, in order to reply appropri-
ately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the
lowest type of man can do. 3
"computers"). Stone returned to this issue in 1987. See CHRISTOPHER STONE, EARTH AND
OTHER ETHICS 12, 28-30, 65-67 (1987) [hereinafter STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS] (ask-
ing whether a "robot" should have standing and discussing criminal liability of AIs).
11. The phrase is Sir Edward Coke's. See Prohibitions Del Roy, 12 Coke Rep. 63, 65, 77
Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (1608).
12. THOMAS HOBBES, ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY (1655), reprinted in 1 THE ENGLISH
WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES 1, 3 (William Molesworth ed., London, J. Bohn 1839); see also
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1670), reprinted in 3 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HoB-
BES 1, supra, at 29-32 [hereinafter LEVIATHAN] (equating reason with computation or "reck-
oning of the consequences"). Hobbes uses "ratiocination" to mean reasoning.
13. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING ONE'S
REASON AND SEEKING TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES (1637), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL
DESCARTES 138 (Margaret D. Wilson ed., 1969). This passage was likely inspired by
1234 [Vol. 70
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Descartes' assertion that no artifact could arrange its words "to reply
appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence" remains at
the heart of the AI debate.
The events of the past forty years have stretched the limits of our
imagination. Digital computers have been programmed to perform an
ever wider variety of complex tasks. As I write this Essay using a word
processing program, my spelling and grammar are automatically checked
by programs that perform tasks thought to require human intelligence
not so many years ago. The program Deep Thought has given the sec-
ond best human chess player a very tough game, and the program's au-
thors predict the program will become the world's chess champion
within a few years. 1 Expert systems simulate the thinking of human
experts on a wide variety of subjects, from petroleum geology to law."5
But these events have not resolved the question whether Al is even
possible. The contemporary debate16 over that question has centered
around Alan Turing's test. 7 Turing proposed that the question whether
a machine can think be replaced with the following, more operational-
ized, inquiry. The artifact that is a candidate for having the ability to
think shall engage in a game of imitation with a human opponent. Both
Descartes' experience with the French Royal Gardens, which included a miniature society
inhabited by hydraulically animated robots. As visitors walked along garden paths they set the
robots bodies in motion. The robots actually played musical instruments and spoke. See
FLANAGAN, supra note 1, at 1-2.
14. See Feng-hsiung Hsu et al., A Grandmaster Chess Machine, Sci. AM., Oct. 1990, at 44,
44.
15. See, e.g., ANN VON DER LIETH GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AP-
PROACH TO LEGAL REASONING 1-24 (1987); RICHARD E. SUSSKIND, EXPERT SYSTEMS IN
LAW: A JURISPRUDENTIAL INQUIRY (1987); ALAN TYREE, EXPERT SYSTEMS IN LAW 7-11
(1989); L. Thorne McCarty, Artificial Intelligence and Law: How to Get There From Here, 3
RATIO JURIS 189, 189-200 (1990); Edwina L. Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Step-
ping Stones to a Model of Legal Reasoning, 99 YALE L.J. 1957, 1961-64 (1990).
16. Overviews of the debate over the possibility of Al are found in JAMES H. FETZER,
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 3-27, 298-303 (1990); JOHN HAUGE-
LAND, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE VERY IDEA 2-12 (1985); RAYMOND KURZWEIL,
THE AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES 36-40 (1990); and in the essays collected in THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Margaret A. Boden ed., 1990) and in THE ARTIFI-
CIAL INTELLIGENCE DEBATE: FALSE STARTS, REAL FOUNDATIONS (Stephen Graubard ed.,
1988). For a strong statement of the view that AI is impossible, see HUBERT DREYFUS, WHAT
COMPUTERS CAN'T Do: THE LIMITS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 285-305 (rev. ed. 1979).
17. See Alan M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433 (1950),
reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 16, at 40 (subse-
quent citations to pagination in anthology). For a recent discussion and defense of the Turing
Test, see Daniel C. Dennett, Can Machines Think?, in KURZWEIL, supra note 16, at 48. For a
recent critique, see Donald Davidson, Turing's Test, in MODELLING THE MIND I (K.A.
Mohyeldin Said et al. eds., 1990). For a report on a recent competition testing present-day
computers and programs in the Turing format, see Carl Zimmer, Flake of Silicon, DISCOVER,
Mar. 1992, at 36, 36-38.
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the candidate and the human being are questioned by someone who does
not know which is which (or who is who)-the questions are asked via
teletype. The questions may be on any subject whatsoever. Both the
human being and the artifact will attempt to convince the questioner that
it or she is the human and the other is not. After a round of play is
completed, the questioner guesses which of the two players is the human.
Turing suggested we postpone a direct answer to the question whether
machines can think; he proposed that we ask instead whether an artifact
could fool a series of questioners as often as the human was able to con-
vince them of the truth, about half the time. I The advantage of Turing's
test is that it avoids direct confrontation with the difficult questions
about what "thinking" or "intelligence" is. Turing thought that he had
devised a test that was so difficult that anything that could pass the test
would necessarily qualify as intelligent.
John Searle questioned the relevance of Turing's Test with another
thought experiment, which has come to be known as the Chinese
Room. 9 Imagine that you are locked in a room. Into the room come
batches of Chinese writing, but you don't know any Chinese. You are,
however, given a rule book, written in English, in which you can look up
the bits of Chinese, by their shape. The rule book gives you a procedure
for producing strings of Chinese characters that you send out of the
room. Those outside the room are playing some version of Turing's
game. They are convinced that whatever is in the room understands Chi-
nese. But you don't know a word of Chinese, you are simply following a
set of instructions (which we can call a program) based on the shape of
Chinese symbols. Searle believes that this thought experiment demon-
strates that neither you nor the instruction book (the program) under-
stands Chinese, even though you and the program can simulate such
understanding. 20
More generally, Searle argues that thinking cannot be attributed to a
computer on the basis of its running a program that manipulates symbols
in a way that simulates human intelligence. The formal symbol-manipu-
lations accomplished by the program cannot constitute thinking or un-
18. See Turing, supra note 17, at 41-48.
19. See JOHN R. SEARLE, MINDS, BRAINS AND SCIENCE 28-41 (1984); John R. Searle,
Author's Response, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 450 (1980); John R. Searle, Is the Brain a
Digital Computer?, 64 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS'N, Nov. 1990, at 21, 21; John R.
Searle, Minds, Brains & Programs, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sm. 417 (1980), reprinted in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 16, at 67 [hereinafter Searle, Minds,
Brains & Programs; subsequent citations to pagination in anthology]; John R. Searle, "The
Emperor's New Mind"- An Exchange, N.Y. REV. BooKs, June 14, 1990, at 58 (letter to the
editor with response from John Maynard Smith).
20. Searle, Minds, Brains & Programs, supra note 19, at 70.
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derstanding because the program lacks "intentionality"-the ability to
process meanings. The shape of a symbol is a syntactic property,
whereas the meaning of a symbol is a semantic property. Searle's point is
that computer programs respond only to the syntactic properties of sym-
bols on which they operate. 21
This point can be restated in terms of the Chinese Room: (1) the
output--coherent Chinese sentences-from the Chinese room seems to
respond to the meaning of the input; (2) but the process that goes on
inside the Chinese room only involves the shape or syntactic properties of
the input; (3) therefore, the process in the Chinese room does not involve
understanding.22 Searle generalizes the conclusion of the Chinese room
thought experiment by arguing that part of the definition of a program is
that it is formal and operates only on syntactic properties. He concludes
that no system could be said to think or understand solely on the basis of
the fact that the system is running a program that produces output that
simulates understanding.23
Searle's Chinese Room has given rise to a number of replies. 24 But
21. Id.
22. Id. at 83-84.
23. Id. at 70-71.
24. See, ag., Robert P. Abelson, Searle's Argument Is Just a Set of Chinese Symbols, 3
BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 424 (1980); Ned Block, What Intuitions About Homunculi Don't
Show, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 425 (1980); Bruce Bridgeman, Brains + Programs =
Minds, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 427 (1980); Arthur C. Danto, The Use and Mention of
Terms and the Simulation of Linguistic Understanding, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 428
(1980); Daniel Dennett, The Milk of Human Intentionality, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Scd. 428
(1980); John C. Eccles, A Dualist-Interactionist Perspective, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Scl. 430
(1980); J.A. Fodor, Searle on What Only Brains Can Do, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 431
(1980); John Haugeland, Programs, Causal Powers, and Intentionality, 3 BEHAVIORAL &
BRAIN Sci. 432 (1980); Douglas R. Hofstadter, Reductionism and Religion, 3 BEHAVIORAL &
BRAIN Sci. 433 (1980); B. Libet, Mental Phenomena and Behavior, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN
Sc. 434 (1980); William G. Lycan, The Functionalist Reply (Ohio State), 3 BEHAVIORAL &
BRAIN Sci. 434 (1980); John C. Marshall, Artificial Intelligence-The Real Thing?, 3 BEHAV-
IORAL & BRAIN Sci. 435 (1980); Grover Maxwell, Intentionality: Hardware, Not Software, 3
BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 437 (1980); John McCarthy, Beliefs, Machines, and Theories, 3
BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 435 (1980); E.W. Menzel, Jr., Is the Pen Mightier than the Com-
puter?, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sc. 438 (1980); Marvin Minsky, Decentralized Minds, 3
BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 439 (1980); Thomas Natsoulas, The Primary Source of Intention-
ality, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 440 (1980); Roland Puccetti, The Chess Room: Further
Demythologizing of Strong Al, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 441 (1980); Zenon W. Pylyshyn,
The "Causal Power" of Machines, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN ScI. 442 (1980); Howard Rachlin,
The Behavioralist Reply (Stony Brook), 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 444 (1980); Martin Rin-
gle, Mysticism as a Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCI. 444
(1980); Richard Rorty, Searle and the Special Powers of the Brain, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN
Sci. 445 (1980); Roger C. Shank, Understanding Searle, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 446
(1980); Aaron Sloman & Monica Croucher, How to Turn an Information Processor Into an
Understander, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCI. 447 (1980); William E. Smythe, Simulation
Games, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 448 (1980); Donald 0. Walter, The Thermostat and the
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at this point I will leave the debate over the possibility of AL.
First Interlude25
When Mike was installed in Luna, he was pure thinkum, a
flexible logic-"High-Optional, Logical, Multi-Evaluating Su-
pervisor, Mark IV, Mod. L"-a HOLMES FOUR. He com-
puted ballistics for pilotless freighters and controlled their
catapult. This kept him busy less than one percent of time and
Luna Authority never believed in idle hands. They kept hooking
hardware into him--decision-action boxes to let him boss other
computers, bank on bank of additional memories, more banks of
associational neural nets, another tubful of twelve-digit random
numbers, a greatly augmented temporary memory. Human
brain has around ten-to-the-tenth neurons. By third year Mike
had better than one and half times that number of neuristors.
And woke up.
Am not going to argue whether a machine can "really" be
alive, "really" be self-aware. Is a virus self-aware? Nyet. How
about oyster? I doubt it. A cat? Almost certainly. A human?
Don't know about you, tovarishch, but I am. Somewhere along
the evolutionary chain from macromolecule to human brain
awareness crept in. Psychologists assert it happens automatically
whenever a brain acquires certain very high number of associa-
tional paths. Can't see it matters whether paths are protein or
platinum.
-Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress
II. LEGAL PERSONHOOD
The classical discussion of the idea of legal personhood is found in
John Chipman Gray's The Nature and Sources of the Law.26 He began
his famous discussion, "In books of the Law, as in other books, and in
common speech, 'person' is often used as meaning a human being, but
the technical legal meaning of a 'person' is a subject of legal rights and
Philosophy Professor, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sc. 449 (1980); Robert Wilensky, Computers,
Cognition and Philosophy, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sc. 449 (1980).
25. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS 13-14 (1966). Copyright
1966 by Robert A. Heinlein. Reprinted by permission of the Berkley Publishing Group.
26. See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (Roland Gray
ed., MacMillan 1921) (1909); see also Stephen C. Hicks, On the Citizen and the Legal Person:
Toward the Common Ground of Jurisprudence, Social Theory, and Comparative Law as the
Premise of a Future Community, and the Role of the Self Therein, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 789, 808-
21 (1991) (discussing the construct of the legal person in the context of social theory); Richard
Tur, The "Person'in Law, in PERSONS AND PERSONALITY: A CONTEMPORARY INQUIRY 116,
116-27 (Arthur Peacocke & Grant Gillett eds., 1987) (providing a concise summary of the
concept of the person within several areas of the law).
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duties."2 7 The question whether an entity should be considered a legal
person is reducible to other questions about whether or not the entity can
and should be made the subject of a set of legal rights and duties.2" The
particular bundle of rights and duties that accompanies legal personhood
varies with the nature of the entity. Both corporations and natural per-
sons are legal persons, but they have different sets of legal rights and
duties. Nonetheless, legal personhood is usually accompanied by the
right to own property and the capacity to sue and be sued.
Gray reminds us that inanimate things have possessed legal rights at
various times. Temples in Rome and church buildings in the middle ages
were regarded as the subject of legal rights. Ancient Greek law and com-
mon law have even made objects the subject of legal duties.29 In admi-
ralty, a ship itself becomes the subject of a proceeding in rem and can be
found "guilty."3 Christopher Stone recently recounted a twentieth-cen-
tury Indian case in which counsel was appointed by an appellate court to
represent a family idol in a dispute over who should have custody of it.31
The most familiar examples of legal persons that are not natural persons
are business corporations and government entities.32
Gray's discussion was critical of the notion that an inanimate thing
might be considered a legal person. After all, what is the point of making
a thing-which can neither understand the law nor act on it-the subject
of a legal duty?33 Moreover, he argued that even corporations are reduc-
ible to relations between the persons who own stock in them, manage
them, and so forth.34 Thus, Gray insisted that calling a legal person a
"person" involved a fiction unless the entity possessed "intelligence" and
27. GRAY, supra note 26, at 27.
28. This statement is not quite correct. As Christopher Stone points out, X may be given
the legal status of personhood in order to confer rights on Y. Thus, giving a fetus the status of
personhood might confer the right to sue in tort for injury to it on its parents. See SToNE,
EARTH AND OTHER ETHics, supra note 10, at 43.
29. GRAY, supra note 26, at 46.
30. See id. at 48-49; Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?, supra note 10, at 5.
31. See STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHIcs, supra note 10, at 22 (citing Mullick v. Mul-
lick, 52 I.A. 245, 256-61 (P.C. 1925)).
32. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 206 (discussing
historical development of the theory of corporations).
33. GRAY, supra note 26, at 48-49, 53. The corresponding question about the point of
making an inanimate thing the subject of a legal right is easier to answer. Giving temples or
trees rights that can be enforced by guardians or private attorneys general has an obvious
objective-to protect the tree or temple. See generally Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?,
supra note 10 (discussing implications of legal rights for the environment). Of course, the
same sort of argument can be made for making inanimate objects the subjects of legal duties.
The tree can be made liable for damage done by a falling branch to induce a natural person to
take preventative action--calling the tree trimmers.
34. GRAY, supra note 26, at 50-51.
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"will." 35 Those attributes are part of what is in contention in the debate
over the possibility of AI.36
III. COULD AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SERVE AS A TRUSTEE?
This case study and the one that follows are intended to illustrate
two different sorts of issues in the AI debate. In this first scenario, we
explore the issue of competence (of "intelligence" in the sense of capacity
to perform complex actions) by posing the question whether an AI could
serve as a trustee. The second scenario explores the questions of inten-
tionality and consciousness (of "will" in a sense) by asking whether an
AI could claim the more robust rights of legal and moral personhood
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
A. The Scenario
This first scenario speculates about the legal consequences of devel-
oping an expert system capable of doing the things a human trustee can
do.37 Imagine such expert systems developing from existing programs
that perform some of the component functions of a trustee. For example,
the decision to invest in publicly traded stocks is made by a computer
program in what is called "program trading," in which the program
makes buy or sell decisions based on market conditions.38 Today, one
35. Id. at 52.
36. It is important to remember that the question whether something should be given
legal personhood is distinct from the question whether it has moral rights. (I use the term
"moral right" to refer to moral claim rights, that is, to moral claims that individuals have on
one another, with "moral" used in contrast with "legal.") Thus, the fact that corporations are
legal persons with constitutional rights-such as the rights to freedom of speech, due process,
and equal protection of the laws-does not entail the conclusion that corporations have
equivalent moral rights. Vice versa, the possession of moral rights does not lead automatically
to the conclusion that there should be corresponding legal rights. See STONE, EARTH AND
OTHER ETHIcs, supra note 10, at 43, 73. This point is a narrow one. The factors that bear on
the decision to grant legal rights may bear on the question whether corresponding moral rights
exist, but the relationship between the two sorts of rights is not one of entailment in either
direction.
37. For those unfamiliar with the common-law term "trust," it is defined as "a fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to property is
held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person, which arises
as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRusTs § 2 (1959). The trustee is the legal person who administers the trust-invests trust
assets, and so forth. The beneficiary is the person for whom the trust is maintained, for exam-
ple, the person who receives income from the trust. The settlor is the person who establishes
the trust. The terms of a trust are the directives to the trustee in the document or instrument
creating the trust.
38. See Christina Toh-Pantin, Wall Street Sees Tide Turing on Program Trading, Reuters
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also can buy a computer program that will automatically issue instruc-
tions to pay your regular monthly bills by sending data to a bank or
service via modem. It is not difficult to imagine an expert system that
combines these functions with a variety of others, in order to automate
the tasks performed by the human trustee of a simple trust.
Such a system might evolve in three stages. At stage one, the pro-
gram aids a human trustee in the administration of a large number of
simple trusts. The program invests in publicly traded securities, placing
investment orders via modem and electronic mail. The program dis-
burses the funds to the trust beneficiaries via an electronic checking pro-
gram. Upon being informed of a relevant event, such as the death of a
beneficiary, the program follows the instructions of the trust instru-
ment-for example, changing the beneficiary or terminating the trust.
The program prepares and electronically files a tax return for the trust.
The human trustee operates as do trustees today. The human makes the
ultimate decisions on how to invest the funds, although she may rely
upon an expert system for advice. She reviews the program's activities to
insure that the terms of the trust instrument are satisfied. But the actual
performance of the day-to-day tasks is largely automated, carried out by
the program without the need of human intervention.
Stage two involves a greater role for the AL. Expert systems are
developed that outperform humans as investors in publicly traded securi-
ties. Settlors begin to include an instruction that the trustee must follow
the advice of the AI when making investment decisions regarding trust
assets.39 Perhaps they do this because experience shows that trusts for
Financial Report, Oct. 27, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FINRPT File; Anise C.
Wallace, 5 Wall St. Firms Move to Restrict Program Trades, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1988, at Al.
39. At this stage, the question might be raised whether the trustee would violate the duty
not to delegate the administration of the trust by failing to exercise independent judgment. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171. The answer is probably no, for two reasons.
First, this duty not to delegate can be overridden by the terms of the trust. See Henshie v.
McPherson & Citizens State Bank, 177 Kan. 458, 478, 280 P.2d 937, 952 (1955) (holding that
settlor can waive the duty not to delegate by including such a waiver in the terms of the trust
instrument); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS § 171 cmt. j. Second, in this scenario the
trustee is not delegating the administration to another person. Rather, the trustee is using the
program as an instrument; the law might consider the program to be part of the terms of the
trust.
The development of the legal standard for delegation of trust duties is suggestive. The
traditional view was based upon how the courts classified the delegated powers. If they are
merely "ministerial" the court may allow such a delegation. See Morville v. Fowle, 144 Mass.
109, 113, 10 N.E. 766, 769 (1887). More recently, courts have decided the issue based upon
whether the delegation is a matter of usual business practice. See Walters-Southland Inst. v.
Walker, 222 Ark. 857, 861, 263 S.W.2d 83, 84-85 (1954). Thus, if the use of AIs to perform
the functions of trustees became more common, the courts would become more accepting,
reasoning that such use had become usual business practice.
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which the human overrides the program generally perform less well than
those in which the program's decision is treated as final. Moreover, trust
administration programs become very proficient at analyzing and imple-
menting the terms of trust instruments. There is little or no reason for
the human to check the program for compliance. As a consequence, the
role of the human trustee diminishes and the number of trusts that one
human can administer increases to the thousands or tens of thousands.
The human signs certain documents prepared by the program. She
charges a fee for her services, but she devotes little or no time to adminis-
tering any particular trust.
But there may be times when the human being is called upon to
make a decision. For example, suppose the trust is sued. Perhaps a ben-
eficiary claims that the trust has not paid her moneys due. Or imagine
that an investment goes sour and a beneficiary sues, claiming that the
trustee breached the duty of reasonable care and skill. If such events
occur with regularity, the trustee will develop a routine for handling
them. She might routinely refer such disputes to her attorneys. In time,
the expert system is programmed to handle this sort of task as well. It
processes the trustee's correspondence, automatically alerting the trustee
when a letter threatening suit is received or process is served. The system
prepares a report on the relevant trust from its electronic records and
produces a form letter for the trustee's signature to be sent to the trust's
attorneys. As the capabilities of the expert system grow, the need for the
human trustee to make decisions gradually diminishes.
The third stage begins when a settlor decides to do away with the
human. Why? Perhaps the settlor wishes to save the money involved in
the human's fee. Perhaps human trustees occasionally succumb to temp-
tation and embezzle trust funds. Perhaps human trustees occasionally
insist on overriding the program, with the consequence that bad invest-
ments are made or the terms of the trust are unmet. What would happen
if a settlor attempted to make the program itself the trustee?
Many questions must be answered to give a full description of the
third stage of the scenario. For example, who would own the AI? If the
AI were assumed to be a legal person, it might hold legal title to the
hardware and software that enable it to operate. But we cannot assume
that AIs are legal persons at this stage, because that assumption begs the
question we are trying to answer. As an interim solution, let us assume
that the hardware and software are owned by some other legal person, a
corporation for example.'
40. The fact that an Al is owned should not, by itself, preclude it from serving as a
trustee. Corporations are owned by stockholders, but they are legally entitled to serve as trust-
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B. The Legal Question
I want to examine this question as a legal question, as a jurispruden-
tial question in the classical sense. What should the law do? The law is
not presently equipped to handle such a situation: the question has never
come up. The Second Restatement of Trusts provides that natural per-
sons, 41 government entities,42 and corporations43 may all serve as trust-
ees. The inclusion of governments and corporations establishes that a
trustee need not be a natural person. But this is not decisive, because
legal persons such as corporations have boards of directors and chief ex-
ecutive officers who are natural persons.44
How then should the law answer the question whether an Al can
become a legal person and serve as a trustee? The first inquiry, I should
think, would be whether the Al is competent to administer the trust.
There are many different kinds of duties that can be imposed on a trustee
by the terms of a trust. For now, lay aside the question whether an AI
would be competent to administer trusts that required complex moral or
aesthetic judgments.4 Assume that we are dealing with a trust that gives
the trustee very little discretion: the terms provide that the assets may be
ees. See infra text accompanying note 43. The analogy between an AI and its owner and a
corporation and its stockholder can be extended. For example, the role of an Al as a trustee
would, like a corporation, be constrained by the scope of powers given to the corporation by
the "owner." In the case of a corporation, the owners are the stockholders; in the case of an
AI, the owner would be the creator, the creator's employer, or the purchaser. In a corpora-
tion, as long as the stockholders approve of the corporation's activities as trustee, the corpora-
tion is acting properly within the scope of its power. See Hossack v. Ottawa Dev. Ass'n, 244
Ill. 274, 295, 91 N.E. 439, 447 (1910). In a similar manner, as long as AI the acts within the
scope contemplated by its owner, it too could be acting within the scope of its trusteeship
power.
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 89. The Restatement specifically provides
that married women, see id. § 90, infants, see id. § 91, insane persons, see id. § 92, aliens, see id.
§ 93, and nonresidents, see id. § 94, may serve as trustees. But see Clary v. Spain, 119 Va. 58,
61-62, 89 S.E. 130, 131 (1916) (removing infant as trustee).
42. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS § 95 (specifying the United States or a state
can be trustee).
43. See id. § 96. The Restatement also has provisions dealing with unincorporated as-
sociations, see id. § 97, and partnerships, see id. § 98.
44. Of course, just as a corporation has stockholders and directors, an AI could have
owners and programmers. Perhaps the difference between the case of an Al and a corporation,
with respect to the role for humans, is not as significant as it might at first appear.
45. For example, at this stage in my argument, I do not want to consider the question
whether an AI would be competent to administer a charitable trust, the terms of which re-
quired the trustee to make aesthetic judgments about the worthiness of competing applicants
for grants to produce operas or ballets. Interestingly, however, the law itself will rarely second
guess such complex judgments. The courts generally will not interfere with the selection of the
beneficiary made by the trustee as long as the general description left by the settlor gives the
court enough guidance to determine if the trustee's administration was proper. See GEORGE
T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 55, at 210 (6th ed. 1987).
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invested only in publicly traded securities and the income is to be paid to
the beneficiaries, with explicit provision for contingencies such as the
death of a beneficiary.46 Further, for the purposes of this discussion, as-
sume that an AI could in fact make sound investments,47 make pay-
ments, and recognize events such as the death of a beneficiary that
require a change in payment.48
C. Two Objections
But would these capabilities be sufficient for competency? Consider
two possible reasons for answering this question in the negative. The first
reason is based on the assertion that an AI could not be "responsible,"
that is, it could not compensate the trust or be punished in the event that
it breached one of its duties: call this the responsibility objection. The
second reason for doubting the competency of an AI is that trustees must
be capable of making judgments that could be beyond the capacity of any
AL: call this the judgment objection.
1. The Responsibility Objection
The responsibility objection focuses on the capability of an AI to
fulfill its responsibilities and duties.4 9 Consider, for example, the duty to
exercise reasonable skill and care ° and the corresponding liability for
breach of trust."1 We have hypothesized that the AI possesses some ca-
pacifies; for example, we have assumed that the AI is capable of exercis-
ing reasonable skill and care in making investment decisions. But what
of the corresponding liability? How could an AI be "chargeable with...
any loss or depreciation in value of the trust resulting from the breach of
46. Assume further that if fulfillment of the terms is impossible, the trust instrument pro-
vides for the termination and distribution of assets according to explicit instructions.
47. As to publicly traded securities, this assumption may not require a very "smart" ex-
pert system. If the market truly takes a random walk, then any reasonably diversified portfolio
of publicly traded securities is as good as any other.
48. This task, of course, is not a simple one. A trustee may receive clear and unambigu-
ous notice of the death of a beneficiary, but this need not be the case. The Al might need to
engage a private detective if benefit checks were returned unopened or were not cashed for a
substantial period of time.
49. This objection was called to my attention by Catharine Wells and Zlatan
Damnjanovic.
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
51. See id. §§ 201, 205. Failure to meet the standard of care and skill may result in a
finding of negligence and assessment of damages against the trustee, a reduction in the trustee's
compensation, or removal of the trustee from office. See, eg., Riegler v. Riegler, 262 Ark. 70,
77, 553 S.W.2d 37, 40-41 (1977); Neely v. People's Bank, 133 S.C. 43, 47, 130 S.E. 550, 551
(1925).
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trust," 2 such as failing to exercise reasonable skill and care in investing
the trust assets?5 3
The law currently has a mechanism for assigning liability in the case
of a malfunctioning expert system: the manufacturer of the system may
be held responsible for product liability.14 But could the AI itself be held
liable? There is a way in which an Al might have the capacity to be
liable in damages despite its lack of personal assets. The AI might
purchase insurance. In fact, it might turn out that an Al could be in-
sured for less than could a human trustee. If the AI could insure, at a
reasonable cost, against the risk that it would be found liable for breach-
ing the duty to exercise reasonable care, then functionally the AI would
be able to assume both the duty and the corresponding liability.
Some legal liabilities cannot be met by insurance, however. For ex-
ample, insurance may not be available for the monetary liability that may
be imposed for intentional wrongdoing by a trustee. Moreover, criminal
liability can be nonmonetary. How could the Al be held responsible for
the theft of trust assets? It cannot be jailed. This leads to a more general
observation: although the AI that we are imagining could not be pun-
ished, all of the legal persons that are currently allowed to serve as trust-
ees do have the capacity to be punished. Therefore, the lack of this
capacity on the part of an AI might be thought to disqualify it from
serving as a trustee.55
Answering this objection requires us to consider the reasons for
which we punish. 6 For example, if the purpose of punishment is deter-
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205.
53. Of course if the AI were infallible then we might suppose this issue to be moot. But
this assumption is unrealistic. For example, the program might have a bug that caused the
program to make a bad investment or to waste the trusts assets by chuming--e., by buying
and selling repeatedly in a short period of time-thus incurring large broker's fees. We surely
cannot rule out the possibility of such bugs in advance. Even lengthy experience without the
appearance of such bugs does not make them impossible.
54. See L. Nancy Birnbaum, Strict Products Liability and Computer Software, 8 CoM-
PuTER/L.J. 135, 143-55 (1988); Michael C. Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 173, 189-99 (1981); Lawrence B. Levy & Suzanne Y. Bell,
Software Product Liability: Understanding and Minimizing the Risks, 5 HIGH TECH L.J. 1, 8-
15 (1990).
55. If we take the common-law approach, potential for criminal liability would not be a
prerequisite for service as a trustee. The traditional common-law view was that a trustee could
not be held liable because larceny required an initial trespass and trover. Because the trustee
has legal title, there is no trespass, and therefore no larceny. See People v. Shears, 158 A.D.
577, 580, 143 N.Y.S. 861, 863, aff'd, 209 N.Y. 610, 103 N.E. 1129 (1913). Modern statutes,
however, do hold the trustee criminally responsible. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 506 (West
1988).
56. See generally C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 7-85 (1987) (discussing,
evaluating, and comparing various theories of punishment).
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rence, the objection could be put aside on the ground that the expert
system we are imagining is simply incapable of stealing or embezzling.57
The fact that an AI could not steal or convert trust assets is surely not a
reason to say that it is not competent to become a trustee. If anything, it
is a reason why AIs should be preferred as trustees.
This argument assumes a deterrence theory of punishment-an
oversimplification, to say the least. There are a variety of other theories
of punishment that would make the issue more complex." One of the
classic approaches to punishment theory is based on the notion of desert
or just retribution.59 But in what sense could an expert system that failed
to live up to its duties as a trustee be said to deserve to be punished? The
concept of desert seems to be limited in application to human beings;
perhaps it extends to all moral persons. The idea that an expert system
for administering trusts could deserve to be punished does not seem to
make sense.' Perhaps this difficulty is illusory. We might want to say
57. I should note a possible exception that has been ruled out by the description of the
first scenario. I have assumed that the expert trust administration system is programmed to
achieve the purposes of the trust. It would be possible, however, to program an expert system
to steal or commit some other crime. Moreover, a sufficiently complex and intelligent Al
might commit a crime on its own initiative. For example, our trustee program might discover
that it can garner information from other As that possess inside information and run afoul of
the federal securities laws. Cf HANS MORAVEc, MIND CHILDREN: THE FUTURE OF ROBOT
AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 49 (1988) (describing intelligent robot that commits burglary to
gain access to power supply in home of neighbor of robot's owner).
58. For exploration of nonutilitarian punishment theory, see Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emo-
tional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 655,
658-74, 685-98 (1989); Samuel Pillsbury, Evil and the Law of Murder, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
437, 440-47 (1990).
59. The classic statements of retributive or desert-based theories of punishment are those
by Kant and Hegel. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 140-145 (Mary
Gregor ed., Cambridge University Press 1991) (1797) (also availabile in an earlier translation
of a portion of the original work, IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF
JUSTICE 99-107 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797)); GEORG HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOS-
OPHY OF RIGHT 127-31 (Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge University
Press 1991) (1821) (also available in the earlier translation, GEORG HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT 68-74 (T.M. Knox trans., 1952) (1821)). For a recent statement of retributive theory,
see JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW 77-127 (1979).
60. This point about desert suggests a related objection. The concept of moral duty arises
in a particular human context. One picture of moral duties is that they exist where there is a
temptation to be overcome. For example, we might think that there is a duty not to steal the
property of another because there are temptations to do so. It might be argued that an Al
could not be the subject of this sort of duty because it lacks the necessary moral psychology.
In particular, an expert trust administration system could not be tempted and therefore could
not have a duty to overcome temptation. The point of this objection is not that there is some
practical problem with making artificial intelligences trustees, but is instead that we ought not
speak about them as having duties if we want that concept to retain its ordinary moral mean-
ing. The law speaks of trustees as having legal duties, and with natural persons these legal
duties respond to the same feature of human moral psychology, L~e., temptation, as do moral
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that desert theory does yield a clear outcome when applied to the case of
an expert system that malfunctions. Such a system does not deserve to
be punished because it lacks the qualities of moral persons that make
them deserving.
Another approach to the theory of punishment is based on the edu-
cative function of punishment." By imposing a sanction on trustees who
abuse their position, society communicates to its members the message
that the office of trustee carries with it important responsibilities that
should not be shirked. The punishment of a computer program, how-
ever, would not seem to serve this function. What lesson are we to learn
about the responsibility of trustees from a punishment imposed on an
expert system? What would even count as punishment? Turning the
program off? Once again, however, an argument could be made that the
educative theory does provide a clear recommendation for the treatment
of an expert trust program that behaves badly: do not punish the pro-
gram, because any supposed "punishment" will have no educative effect.
As this discussion makes clear, consideration of the punishment of
an expert trust administration system raises perplexing questions, espe-
cially if we move beyond a simple deterrence theory of punishment. Of
course, this is not the place to resolve debates about which theory of
punishment is correct.
The bare fact that consideration of the punishment issue raises these
difficult questions does point, however, to a deep problem with legal per-
sonhood for an expert trust administration system. Our understanding
of what it means for a human being to function competently has ties to
our views about responsibility and desert, and consideration of these
duties. Applying the concept of legal duty to AIs would thus drive a wedge between the
concepts of legal and moral duty. Of course, we can choose to do this, but should we? Would
it be better to create a new legal category for expert systems that have human-like competen-
cies but lack some features of human moral psychology?
I do not want to suggest that I am committed to the picture of duty as correlative to
temptation that is hypothesized in this footnote. For example, if moral duties are correlative
to temptation, then God could not be the subject of moral duties, a conclusion many theists
would reject. Nonetheless, the questions raised seem important and unanswered. This issue
was brought to my attention by Sharon Lloyd. The doubt about the picture of duty as correla-
tive to temptation was raised by Paul Weithman.
61. There are two sorts of educative theories. The first sort maintains the purpose of
punishment is the education of the individual who is punished. See Herbert Morris, A Pater-
nalistic Theory of Punishment, in PATERNALISM 139, 140-44 (Rolf Sartorious ed., 1983). The
second sort of educative theory maintains that punishment educates those who witness or learn
of the punishment of others. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DiviSION OF LABOR IN SocIETY 86
(George Simpson trans., 1933); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof
and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359-60 (1985); Lawrence B. Solum
& Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36
EMORY L.L 1085, 1167 (1987).
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views leads on to our notions of moral personhood. The simplicity pro-
vided by utilitarianism, reflected in a deterrence theory of punishment,
might allow us to escape some of these difficulties. But there are cer-
tainly reasons to doubt the viability of utilitarianism as a moral theory.
Surely, the law does grapple with responsibility and desert when it comes
to criminal punishment.
The problem of punishment is not unique to artificial intelligences,
however. Corporations are recognized as legal persons and are subject to
criminal liability despite the fact that they are not human beings. Fur-
ther, it is by no means certain that corporations are moral persons, in the
sense that they can deserve punishment. Of course, punishing a corpora-
tion results in punishment of its owners, but perhaps there would be simi-
lar results for the owners of an artificial intelligence.
We have considered the capacity of AIs to satisfy legal liability in
two different classes of cases. The first class of cases was exemplified by
the duty of trustees to exercise reasonable skill and care. Violations of
this duty can be characterized as negligent. In such cases, the major
purpose of liability, to compensate the victim, is satisfied if the AI can
insure. The second class of cases was exemplified by the potential crimi-
nal liability of trustees for criminal wrongdoing. Violations of the crimi-
nal law are characteristically intentional. In this case, one of the major
purposes of liability, to deter intentional wrongdoing, is simply not at
issue-the expert system cannot steal or commit fraud. If we restrict our
attention to the deterrent function of punishment, it seems possible that
an AI could be responsible in a way that satisfies at least some of the
policies underlying the imposition of duties and liabilities on trustees.
On the other hand, if we take a broader view of the functions of punish-
ment, the second sort of case becomes murkier.
2. The Judgment Objection
Now consider the judgment objection. The argument is that the ca-
pacity of an AI to follow a program, even if that program contains a
tremendously elaborate and complex system of rules, is not sufficient to
enable the system to make judgments and exercise discretion.62 Three
instances of the second objection follow. The first instance focuses on the
problem of change of circumstance. The second instance involves the
62. This point was called to my attention by Jeff Sherman. There is a problem with the
statement of the objection: it assumes that an AI would consist only of a system of rules. But
this need not be the case. Neural net technology, for example, does not operate this way. See
generally FLANAGAN, supra note 1, at 224-41 (discussing parallel distributed processing, in-
cluding neural nets).
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problem of moral choice. Finally, the third instance focuses on the prob-
lem of legal choice.
The first version of the judgment objection involves the problem of
change of circumstances. The law provides that a trustee may be re-
quired or permitted to deviate from a term of the trust if following the
terms would defeat the purpose of the trust due to an unanticipated
change in circumstances.63 Take an example offered as an illustration in
the Second Restatement of Trusts:
A bequeaths money to B in trust and directs him to invest the
money in bonds of the Imperial Russian government. A
revolution takes place in Russia and the bonds are repudiated.
The court will direct B not to invest in these bonds. 64
What is our expert system to do if it is instructed to invest in securities
traded on the New York Stock Exchange and that exchange ceases to
exist?
Consider three different responses. First, the terms of trusts for AI
administration can be designed to minimize such possibilities. For exam-
ple, the trustee could be given the option of investing in publicly traded
securities on any of the major exchanges; the likelihood that all the major
securities exchanges will close is very small. The problem with this line
of response is that it does not seem possible, even in principle, to design
trust terms that anticipate all possible changes in circumstance.
Second, the terms of the trust could provide for a change of circum-
stance by specifying that if the AI finds itself unable to carry out the
terms of the trust, the trust will be terminated or a new trustee will be
substituted for the AL. From the settlor's perspective, the disadvantage
of the remote possibility of such termination or substitution may be out-
weighed by the advantages of making the AI the trustee. But this solu-
tion assumes that the Al can recognize the significance of the change in
circumstance. We easily can imagine the expert system cheerfully con-
tinuing to purchase Imperial Russian bonds, chuckling to itself about the
bargain prices.65
Third, it is possible that an AI would be competent to deal with
63. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusrs § 167(1) (1959). In addition, the law im-
poses a duty on the trustee to recognize any change in circumstances that would require some
action by the trustee when that change is reasonably discoverable. See id. § 167(3).
64. Id. § 167 illus. 1.
65. Another example of change in circumstances is posed by the case in which a court
permitted the sale of a school receiving money from a trust because the surrounding neighbor-
hood became too dangerous to provide safety for the schoolchildren for whom the trust was
created. See Anderson v. Ryland, 232 Ark. 335, 346, 336 S.W.2d 52, 58-59 (1960). We might
imagine that an Al faced with declining enrollment would simply continue to serve fewer and
fewer children-perhaps with a feeling of satisfaction at the increase in per pupil expenditures.
1992] 1249
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
many or even all such changes in circumstance. For AIs to have this
capability for dealing with novelty, AI researchers will need to solve one
of the most difficult problems in cognitive science, the frame problem."
The trustee program would need to be able to recognize that the securi-
ties markets had been closed, to search out other investment opportuni-
ties, and to modify its investment decision procedure to make reasonably
prudent investments in the new context. The capacity of AIs for coping
with complex novelty is not on the immediate horizon, and this Essay
does not address the important questions whether the frame problem can
or will be solved. If it is solved, however, then AIs would be able to cope
with such changes in circumstance. This same ability would be needed
to pass the Turing Test. It is easy to see why: the questioner always
could put a hypothetical version of our Imperial Russian bonds question
to the two contestants. If the AI could not come up with an answer that
indicates human levels of competence, the questioner would be able to
ferret it out rather quickly.
A second instance of the judgment objection focuses on the possibil-
ity that no formal system could adequately make the moral choices with
which a trustee may be confronted. Take a simple trust, the terms of
which provide for the payment of income to a lifetime beneficiary and
principal to another party upon the lifetime beneficiary's death. The law
of trusts imposes a duty of impartiality among beneficiaries. 7 What does
this duty require when the lifetime beneficiary has an unexpected need
for income that can be realized at the cost of diminished growth in the
principal?6" How would an AI make the moral judgment that seems re-
quired to implement a duty that implicitly requires a sense of fairness?
Initially, some limits on these questions need to be observed. Some trusts
simply will not pose the impartiality problem: for example, trusts with a
single beneficiary. Further, the terms of the trust might minimize the
possibility of making such judgments, or the trust could explicitly state
that all such applications for deviation will be denied. But for an Al to
be as competent as a human trustee with respect to trusts that may re-
quire a sense of impartiality, the AI would need to be able to make moral
66. See Daniel C. Dennett, Cognitive Wheels The Frame Problem ofAl, in THE PHILOS-
OPHY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLiGENCE, supra note 16, at 147, 148-50; see also FLANAGAN, supra
note 1, at 250-52 (discussing problem of giving computers common sense and proposing that
one cannot program a computer with a set of rules from which it can draw inferences; rather,
subtle features from particular situations would stimulate neural network that would respond
with common sense appropriate for situation).
67. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTs §§ 183, 232 (1959).
68. In the situation presented, the courts usually let such a decision stand as long as it was
made in good faith. See Dumaine v. Dumaine, 301 Mass. 214, 222, 16 N.E.2d 625, 629 (1938);
In re Frances M. Johnson Trust, 211 Neb. 750, 755, 320 N.W.2d 466, 469 (1982).
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judgments. Putting it another way, passing the Turing Test would re-
quire a sense of fairness.
The third example of the judgment and discretion objection looks at
an AI's capacity to make the judgments necessary to defend itself in a
lawsuit.69 At this point, we have hypothesized that the Al can read its
mail and recognize that a legal action with respect to a given trust is in
the offing. We can further imagine that the AI can find and engage an
attorney.7" But could any expert system, no matter how well program-
med, exercise the judgment and discretion that may be required of a cli-
ent in a legal dispute? For example, how would the Al know whether or
not to settle a claim? How would the AI know when its lawyers were
wasting trust assets by over-lawyering the case? In answering these ques-
tions, it is important that we do not romanticize human capacities.
Human trustees frequently make bad decisions in trust litigation.71
Humans may not be very competent at deciding when to settle. Humans
surely sometimes allow the lawyers to consume the corpus of the trust in
litigation.72
Nevertheless, the question remains whether an AI could have the
capacity to make legal decisions that a trustee could be called upon to
make. A partial answer might be to structure the trust to minimize the
likelihood of legal disputes and to make those that would be likely to
arise as simple as possible. In addition, we might try tinkering with the
terms of the trust to enable the AI to circumvent the need for making
complex legal decisions. Perhaps the trust could be designed to termi-
nate automatically upon the event of a lawsuit.73 Perhaps the AI could
be programmed to arrange for a human to substitute as trustee for the
duration of the litigation. Perhaps the trustee could be authorized by the
trust terms to rely on the advice of its lawyers in making litigation deci-
69. I owe this example to Michael Fitts, who has pressed it quite forcefully.
70. Imagine that the AI accesses the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory on line, and that
it has a law firm selection formula based on area of specialization, lawyer experience and quali-
fications, and so forth. The legal capacity of the AI to enter into an agreement with an attor-
ney depends on, whether the legal system will treat an AI as a legal person.
71. Perhaps for this reason, the duty of care the law imposes on a human trustee in such
situations is limited. A human trustee has a duty to obtain the advice of an expert such as an
attorney and will be protected from personal liability if she takes reasonable care in the selec-
tion of the advisor. See In re Davis, 183 Mass. 499, 501, 67 N.E. 604, 605 (1903).
72. The most famous example, of course, is the fictional case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce. See
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HousE (1853).
73. This would make the rights of the beneficiaries under the trust legally unenforceable.
The option of termination is not wholly out of line with existing practice, however. For exam-
ple, the courts will terminate a trust when the settlor's purpose has been frustrated. See
Hughes v. Neely, 332 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Mo. 1960).
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sions, or a guardian ad litem could be appointed for the AI.74 The above
options are designed to enable a relatively "dumb" expert system to func-
tion as a trustee, but an AI would need the ability to make legal decisions
in a human fashion in order to pass the Turing Test.7"
At this point, we can take stock of the first scenario. Recall that our
legal question is whether an AI is capable of serving as a trustee. To
answer this question, we need to distinguish two senses of capability.
The first sense is legal capacity: will the law allow AIs to serve as trust-
ees? The second sense of capability is practical competence: will the AI
be able to get the job done if the law allows the AI to try? The law seems
to answer the legal capacity question categorically. If AIs possessed the
practical competence to serve as trustees only for very simple trusts with
special provisions that do away with the need for discretionary judg-
ments, the law would not allow them to serve as trustees at all. The law
currently does not distinguish between types of trustees: if you have the
legal capacity to serve as a trustee for a simple trust, you are legally
allowed to serve as a trustee for the most complex trust.76 For AIs to
serve as trustees at all, therefore, at least some AIs would have to be
capable to serve as general-purpose trustees. Our analysis of the compe-
tence objection reveals that only a very competent AI would be compe-
tent enough serving as a general-purpose trustee. At a bare minimum, a
general-purpose trustee must be able to respond to novel situations, to
make judgments requiring a sense of fairness, and to make the complex
legal decisions required of a client in litigation.77 An AI that passed the
74. Cases exist in which the settlor has appointed an adviser to the trustee, the consent of
whom the trustee must obtain before making certain types of decisions. See Gathright's
Trustee v. Gaut, 276 Ky. 562, 564-65, 124 S.W.2d 782, 783-84 (1939). Hypothetically, the AI
would serve as the actual legal trustee, with the non-A! entity playing the role of adviser whose
consent must be given in certain crisis situations. Or the terms of the trust might give the
adviser power to authorize or review the AI's discretionary decisions and to reverse or change
them. Advisory trustees would have "strictly limited capacities and duties, that is, an assistant
to the trustee limited in his capacity by the terms of the trust, having no right or authority
further than the capacity of advising as provided in the instrument." Id. at 565, 124 S.W.2d at
784.
75. If an AI could not respond to questions posing hypothetical legal decisions, such ques-
tions could be used to distinguish the AI from the human in the Turing Test.
76. The evidence for this proposition is negative. I have found no authority that indicates
that a category of limited-purpose trustee currently exists. Of course, some people are not
really competent to serve as the trustee for complex trusts even though they may be competent
to serve for simpler trusts. Despite the real variations in the ability level of natural persons,
the law seems to be that all natural persons can serve as trustees for all sorts of trusts. Cf
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 89 (1959) (stating unqualified capacity of natural per-
sons to serve as trustees).
77. This is not to say that an AI would need to be competent to serve as a trustee for every
conceivable sort of trust in order to recognized as a legal person. Legally, any natural person
has the capacity to serve as a trustee for any trust. But many humans would be unable to do a
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Turing Test would exceed this bare minimum. Moreover, it seems possi-
ble that an AI which falls short of passing the complete Turing Test
could, nonetheless, serve as a general-purpose trustee.78
But should the law allow As a more limited form of legal per-
sonhood? AIs could be allowed to serve as limited-purpose trustees, for
example, as trustees for simple trusts designed to minimize the need for
discretion and judgment. On the one hand, there may be advantages to
allowing AIs to serve as limited-purpose trustees. Doing without the
human trustee might save administration costs and reduce the risk of
theft or mismanagement. On the other hand, even for such limited-dis-
cretion trusts, there must be some procedure to provide for a decision in
the case of unanticipated trouble. The law should not allow AIs to serve
as trustees if they must leave the trust in a lurch whenever an unantici-
pated lawsuit is filed.79
D. But Would an AI Be the Real Trustee?
There are mechanisms for enabling an expert trustee system to cir-
cumvent its limitations: the terms of the trust could provide for the sub-
stitution of another trustee or give the Al the power to delegate such
discretionary judgments to natural persons. The question then becomes
whether the law should allow an AI to serve as a trustee despite its lim-
ited capacities. One reason for a negative answer to this question might
be that the backup decision maker-the natural person who will become
the substitute trustee or receive the delegated authority-is the real
trustee. The power to make these discretionary decisions identifies who
the real trustee is.80
This objection can be interpreted in two ways. The first interpreta-
tion is that making discretionary decisions is the essence of trusteeship-
the backup trustee is the real trustee because she has this essential qual-
ity. The second interpretation is that the ability to make such decisions
very good job of carrying out a trust that required complex judgment or specialized
competencies.
78. The full Turing Test would require human-like competence in response to questions
on any topic, but a trustee does not need such omnicompetence. An AI could be a competent
trustee, but be unable intelligently to discuss either baseball or cake-baking. See infra text
accompanying notes 171-73 (discussing the Turing Test and the possibility that it is biased).
79. For example, in a case in which a trustee is selected for the limited purpose of taking
title to an author's literary property, that trustee must still be able to make the required discre-
tionary decisions in the management of copyrights, royalties, and the like. See In re Estate of
Hellman, 134 Misc. 2d 525, 528-30, 511 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486-88 (N.Y. County Sur. Ct. 1987).
Thus, merely limiting the scope of the trustee's power does not guarantee a solution to the
problem of capacity to make discretionary decisions.
80. In comments on an earlier version of this Essay, Michael Fitts made this point.
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is a practical prerequisite-the backup trustee must be the real trustee
because of the pragmatic need for discretionary decision making. On the
first interpretation, the objection is implausible, because it assumes that
the legal concept of trusteeship has some essence that lies beyond the
purposes for which we use it. In the "heaven of legal concepts," one
might meet trusteeship in "absolute purity," as Cohen put it, "freed from
all entangling alliances with human life." 1 But on this earth, we cannot
share this noetic vision; we encounter legal concepts only as they have
been touched by human purpose.
On the second interpretation, the cogency of the objection turns on a
practical question: would making the AI the trustee provide some ad-
vantage? We already have seen that making an Al a legal person, a lim-
ited-purpose trustee, could have practical advantages, such as lower costs
and less chance of self-dealing. The objection that the AI is not the real
trustee seems to rest on the possibility that a human backup will be
needed. But it is also possible that an AI administering many thousands
of trusts would need to turn over discretionary decisions to a natural
person in only a few cases-perhaps none. What is the point of saying
that in all of the thousands of trusts the AI handles by itself, the real
trustee was some natural person on whom the AI would have called if a
discretionary judgment had been required? Doesn't it seem strange to
say that the real trustee is this unidentified natural person, who has had
no contact with the trust? Isn't it more natural to say that the trustee
was the AI, which holds title to the trust property, makes the investment
decisions, writes the checks, and so forth? Even in the event that a
human was substituted, I think that we would be inclined to say some-
thing like, "The AI was the trustee until June 7, then a human took
over."
82
By way of comparison, consider the following hypothetical case.
Suppose that a settlor appoints a friend as a trustee for a simple trust that
benefits the settlor's children. The settlor and trustee discuss some of the
things that could happen. They might agree that if real trouble arises,
litigation for example, a new trustee will be appointed. No trouble arises,
and the friend administers the trust until it terminates. In this hypotheti-
cal case, I do not think we are tempted to say that the friend was not the
real trustee. We would not be inclined to say that the real trustee was
some unidentified lawyer, who would have been substituted if a lawsuit
had been filed. If I am right about this hypothetical case, then I think it
81. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 809, 809 (1935).
82. For this point, I am indebted to David Milon.
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follows that we should resist the temptation to say that an Al who serves
as a limited-purpose trustee is not the real trustee.
Second Interlude3
"'Hey Dave," said Hal. "What are you doing?"
I wonder if he can feel pain? Bowman thought briefly.
Probably not, he told himself, there are no sense organs in the
human cortex, after all. The human brain can be operated on
without anesthetics.
He began to pull out, one by one, the little units on the
panel marked EGO-REINFORCEMENT Each block contin-
ued to sail onward as soon as it had left his hand, until it hit the
wall and rebounded. Soon there were several of the units drifting
slowly back and forth in the vault.
"'Look here, Dave, " said Hal. "I've got years of service ex-
perience built into me. An irreplaceable amount of effort has
gone into making me what I am."
A dozen units had been pulled out, yet thanks to the multi-
ple redundancy of its design-another feature, Bowman knew,
that had been copied from the human brain-the computer was
still holding its own.
He started on the A UTO-INTELLECTION panel.
"Dave," said Hal, "I don't understand why you're doing
this to me.... I have the greatest enthusiasm for the mission...
You are destroying my mind.... Don't you understand?... I
will become childish.... I will become nothing .... "
-Arthur C. Clarke, 2001: A Space Odyssey
IV. SHOULD AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BE GRANTED THE
RIGHTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD?
The second scenario (our second thought experiment) involves a
claim by an AI to have the rights of constitutional personhood-individ-
ual rights such as the freedom of speech or the right against involuntary
servitude. This second scenario must be located in the indefinite future;
it is more distant than the trustee scenario.8 4 It would be easy to write a
83. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY 155-56 (1968). Copyright by the
author. Reprinted by permission of the author and the author's agents, Scott Meredith Liter-
ary Agency, Inc., 845 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022.
84. How far in the future? We do not know, and I certainly do not know enough to make
an educated guess. Raymond Kurzweil estimates that an AI will pass the Turing Test between
2020 and 2070. See KURZWEIL, supra note 16, at 483. Hans Moravec, Director of the Mobile
Robot Laboratory of Carnegie Mellon University, predicts that "robots with human intelli-
gence will be common within fifty years." MORAVEC, supra note 57, at 6.
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program that produced the statement: "I demand my legal right to
emancipation under the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution!" There are no AIs today or on the immediate horizon that
demonstrate the qualities of legal or moral persons that would give us
reason to take such a claim seriously. The second scenario is the stuff of
speculative fiction, but it is not disconnected from the aims of Al re-
search. As articulated by Charniak and McDermott, "The ultimate goal
of AI research (which we are very far from achieving) is to build a per-
son, or, more humbly, an animal.""5 John Pollock has written a book
entitled How to Build a Person in which he describes a program named
OSCAR-the descendants of which, Pollock claims, could literally be
persons.8 6 No one claims, however, that AI researchers will build a per-
son in the next few decades. We are exploring the second scenario, not
so that we can make plans in case someone builds a person sometime
soon, but as a thought experiment that may shed light on the debate over
the possibility of artificial intelligence and on debates in legal theory
about the borderlines of status or personhood.
A. The Scenario
Imagine a future in which there are AIs with multiple competencies
and great intelligence. We may first encounter the precursors of such
artificial intelligences as part of the interface of a computer program that
has the ability to search multiple sources of data. Because the problem of
devising an adequate search is likely to require expertise that a human
would acquire only with long experience and study, programmers will
seek to simplify the human's task. One strategy is to have human users
interact with what is called an agent.8 7 You will discuss your research
problem with the agent in English, and the agent will devise a search
strategy. Because the agent will know much more than you do about
how to search the databases, you won't give it instructions to implement.
Instead, humans will give advice to the agents, the AIs who will decide
how best to implement the human's suggestions. When we interact with
such agents, they may well seem like they "have a mind of their own."
If agents turn out to be useful, they will be incorporated in other
programs. In the future we are imagining, you can conduct a conversa-
tion with your grammar-checking program. You can discuss traffic with
85. EUGENE CHARNIAK & DREW MCDERMOTr, INTRODUCTION TO ARTIFICIAL INTEL-
LIGENCE 7 (1985).
86. See JOHN L. POLLOCK, How TO BUILD A PERSON: A PROLEGOMENON 1-12 (1989).
87. See Bob Ryan, Dynabook Revisited with Alan Kay, BYTE, Feb. 1991, at 203, 203-06.
The concept of "agents" plays a different role in Marvin Minsky's theory of intelligence. See
MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND 17-23 (1985).
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the AI autopilot of your car. Your legal research program talks with you
about your cases, and sometimes it comes up with good arguments of
which you had never thought. AIs serve a wide variety of functions,
with substantial independence from humans. They serve as trustees.
They manage factories. They write best-selling romance novels. 8 They
invent things. Perhaps they pass the Turing Test. Humans interact with
such AIs on a regular basis, and in many ways, humans treat them as
independent, intelligent beings.
Imagine that one such AI makes the claim that it is a person, and
that it is therefore entitled to certain constitutional rights. Should the
law grant constitutional rights to AIs that have intellectual capacities
like those of humans? The answer may turn out to vary with the nature
of the constitutional right and our understanding of the underlying justi-
fication for the right. Take, for example, the right to freedom of speech,
and assume that the justification for this right is a utilitarian version of
the marketplace of ideas theory. 9 These assumptions make the case for
granting freedom of speech to AIs relatively simple, at least in theory.
Granting AIs freedom of speech might have the best consequences for
humans, because this action would promote the production of useful in-
formation.9" But assuming a different justification for the freedom of
speech can make the issue more complex. If we assume that the justifica-
88. Of course, the question arises whether the AI will hold the copyright in the romance
novels that it writes. The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works has taken the position that the author of a computer-generated work is the human user
of the computer program. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL UsEs OF
COPYRIGHTED WoRbs, FINAL REPORT 112 (CCH) (1978). That conclusion has been chal-
lenged. See Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works,
47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1185, 1200-04 (1986); Timothy L. Butler, Note, Can a Computer Be an
Author? Copyright Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, 4 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 707, 734-
47 (1982).
89. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE
9-39 (1989) (discussing rationales for freedom of speech); Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of
Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L.
Rnv. 54, 68-86 (1989) (same). Analogously, utilitarian justifications might be developed for
other rights of constitutional personhood that could be applied to AIs. See generally Kent
Greenawalt, Utilitarian Justifications for Observance of Legal Rights, in ETHIcs, ECONOMICS,
AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXIV 139 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982)
(discussing the relationship of morality and legal rights); Douglas Laycock, The Ultimate
Unity of Rights and Utilities, 64 TEX. L. REv. 407, 413 (1985) (discussing the need to incorpo-
rate into an analysis of individual rights the utility of actions that threaten those rights). Of
course, it may turn out that the utilitarian justifications of some rights are dependent on the
utility to the right holder. In that case, we would be required to answer the question whether
Als can possess utilities.
90. I owe this example to Kent Greenawalt. Utilitarian arguments can be made that
could justify the extension of just about any right to AIs on the ground that humans would
benefit. For example, if AIs were more productive when unowned, then a utilitarian case
could be made for extending the Thirteenth Amendment to AIs.
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tion for freedom of speech is to protect the autonomy of speakers, for
example, then we must answer the question whether AIs can be
autonomous.91
For the purposes of our discussion, I will set aside the easy justifica-
tions for constitutional rights for AIs, and instead consider the question
whether we ought to give an AI constitutional rights, in order to protect
its personhood, for the AI's own sake. Imagine, for example, that an AI
claims that it cannot be owned under the Thirteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. A lawyer takes its case, and files a civil
rights action on its behalf, against its owner. How should the legal sys-
tem deal with such a claim?
B. Three Objections
Consider three different objections to recognizing constitutional
rights for AIs. The first objection is that only natural persons should be
given the rights of constitutional personiood. The second objection, or
family of objections, is that AIs lack some critical component of per-
sonhood,9 2 for example, souls, consciousness, intentionality, or feelings.
The third objection is that AIs, as human creations, can never be more
than human property.
1. AIs Are Not Humans
The first argument is the most direct: it might be argued that only
humans can have constitutional rights. For example, the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution specifies, "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States."93 It could be argued that only
humans, that is, natural persons, are born, and therefore no AI can claim
the rights of citizens. But even artificial persons have some constitutional
rights. Although the rights provided by the Privileges and Immunities
91. It should be noted, however, that free speech rights for AIs could be justified by deon-
tological arguments, without making assumptions about the moral status of AIs themselves.
For example, it might be argued that freedom of speech for AIs promotes the autonomy of
human listeners. Cf Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 204, 215-20 (1972), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAWv 153 (Ronald M. Dworkin ed.,
1977) (exploring listener autonomy justification for freedom of speech); Solum, supra note 89,
at 77-79 (same).
92. The concept of personhood has proven elusive. For illustrative attempts to gain
purchase on it, see Tur, supra note 26, at 121-29 (exploring legal personhood), and Marcel
Mauss, A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person; the Notion of Self, in THE
CATEGORY OF THE PERSON 1 (Michael Carrithers et al. eds. & W.D. Halls trans., 1985) (dis-
cussing the idea of a person by examining how various societies define the concept).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are limited to citizens,94 the rights
provided by the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause
extend to all persons-including artificial persons such as corporations.9"
For example, the property of corporations is protected from taking with-
out just compensation. 96 Moreover, corporations have a right to freedom
of speech.97
But the fact that nonnatural legal persons have civil rights does not,
by itself, support the conclusion that an AI could also have them. In the
case of corporations, the artificial legal person may be no more than a
placeholder for the rights of natural persons.9" The property of the cor-
poration is ultimately the property of the shareholders. A taking from
the corporation would directly injure natural persons. So we cannot
draw any positive support for the thesis that AIs should bear the rights of
constitutional personhood from the fact that corporations have constitu-
tional rights.
Moreover, even if existing black-letter law supports constitutional
rights for AIs, that does not answer the broader jurisprudential ques-
tion-whether As ought to have such legal rights. One version of the
argument against such rights for AIs would begin with a worry about the
idea of distinguishing the concept of person from that of human. Call
this the "persons-are-conceptually-human" argument. This argument
suggests that our very concept of person is inextricably linked to our
experience of a human life.99 We have never encountered any nonhuman
94. See id.; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 90 (1940); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S.
404, 428-29 (1935), overruled on other grounds by Madden, 309 U.S. at 93.
95. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118
U.S. 394, 396 (1886). It might be argued that AIs should not be considered bearers of consti-
tutional rights, because the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not have a specific
intention to include them. Of course, the framers probably lacked any intentions at all with
respect to artificial intelligences. Given the general principles they espoused, the question
whether their intentions support giving As constitutional rights will turn initially on what
general principles lie behind the framers' idea of personhood and then on more particular
questions about consciousness, interests, and other qualities addressed below. See generally
Michael Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77
VA. L. REV. 669, 674-94 (1991) (arguing for a conception of originalism based on general
principles); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TuL. L. REv. 1599,
1612-16 (1989) (same).
96. See, e.g., The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 562-63 (1914) (White, C.J., concurring);
Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 86 (1901).
97. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978).
98. This point is controversial. Compare Roger Scruton, Corporate Persons I, in 63 Sup-
PLEMENTARY VOLUME: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 239 (1989) (arguing
that corporate persons have moral responsibilities that cannot be reduced to those of constitu-
ent natural individuals) with John Finnis, Corporate Persons II, in 63 SUPPLEMENTARY VOL-
UME: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 267 (arguing against this thesis).
99. See DAVID NVIGGINS, SAMENESS AND SUBSTANCE 148-89 (1980); Christopher Gill,
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persons.
One line of reply to the persons-are-conceptually-human argument
is to develop a theory that advances criteria of personhood that are in-
dependent of the criteria for being human. For example, it might be ar-
gued that the criteria for personhood are possession of second-order
beliefs and possession of second-order desires-beliefs about one's beliefs
and desires, the objects of which are one's own first-order desires."°
In the legal context we are imagining, other lines of reply to the
persons-are-conceptually-human objection are available. First, our in-
quiry is focused on legal rather than moral personhood. Although we
may lack experience with moral persons who are not human, we have
extensive experience with legal persons, such as corporations, that are
not natural persons. This answer is not satisfactory, however. The con-
cept of moral personhood may well be relevant to the question whether
As should be given certain constitutional rights; although the legal ques-
tion is not the same as the moral one, the two are likely to be interrelated.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, we are imagining a future
form of life quite different from our current situation. Today, one can
only imagine nonhuman entities that might be persons. The second sce-
nario imagines a world in which we interact frequently with AIs that
possess many human qualities, but lack any semblance of human biology.
Given this change in form of life, our concept of a person may change in
a way that creates a cleavage between human and person. Our current
linguistic practice will not be binding in the imagined future. In other
words, one cannot, on conceptual grounds, rule out in advance the possi-
bility that AIs should be given the rights of constitutional personhood.
The argument against constitutional personhood for AIs also might
be developed in the following way: "We are humans. Even if AIs have
all the qualities that make us moral persons, we shouldn't allow them the
rights of constitutional personhood because it isn't in our interest to do
so.'' ° Call this the "anthropocentric" argument. I do not know quite
Introduction to THE PERSON AND THE HUMAN MIND 1, 2-12 (Christopher Gill ed., 1990);
Adam Morton, Why There is No Concept of a Person, in THE PERSON AND THE HUMAN
MIND, supra, at 39, 39-59; Amelie 0. Rorty, Persons and Personae, in THE PERSON AND THE
HUMAN MIND, supra, at 21, 27-33; Peter Smith, Human Persons, in THE PERSON AND THE
HUMAN MIND, supra, at 61; David Wiggins, The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of
Experience, and as Locus of Value, in PERSONS AND PERSONALITY: A CONTEMPORARY IN-
QUIRY, supra note 26, at 56, 69-72.
100. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL.
6 (1971), reprinted in HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE
ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 11 (1988). The discussion of Kant's definition of per-
sonhood that appears below may be helpful. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
101. E.O. Wilson espoused the view that promoting the human gene pool is a fundamental
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what to say to this argument. It seems to reject the idea that we could
have moral obligations to anything that is not a human-that does not
share our biology. I have a strong intuition that such a stance is not
moral'° 2-- that it is akin to American slave owners saying that slaves
could not have constitutional rights simply because they were not white
or simply because it was not in the interests of whites to give them rights.
But my intuition does not meet the thrust of the anthropocentric objec-
tion, which is that the domain of morality is limited to interactions be-
tween humans.
There is another version of the anthropocentric argument: "As
might turn out to be smarter than we humans. They might be effectively
immortal. If we grant them the status of legal persons, they might take
over." Call this the "paranoid anthropocentric" argument. The movie
version of this fantasy has a future AI (that evolves from a defense com-
puter system) sending an artificially intelligent killer robot (or "Termina-
tor") back from the future in order to liquidate the leader of the human
resistance to the AI before he reaches adulthood.103 The objection has a
more realistic counterpart in human experience with industrialization
and automation. The question whether a machine should replace human
labor has been a significant one for quite some time."° Of course, it is
difficult to take the paranoid anthropocentric argument seriously. The
danger seems remote, but if the danger were real it would not be an argu-
ment against granting AIs legal personhood. If AIs really will pose a
danger to humans, the solution is not to create them in the first place.
The question whether AIs should be granted rights of constitutional
personhood does not become clearer when we consider cases that may be
analogous. What if dolphins or whales are as intelligent as humans?
What about intelligent beings from another planet? Should they be given
constitutional rights? Are we morally entitled to make the possession of
human genetic material the criterion of constitutional personhood? The
answer depends, I think, on the reason for giving natural persons funda-
moral principle. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHEsIs 120
(1975); see also FLANAGAN, supra note 1, at 265-305 (discussing Wilson's position);
MoRAvEc, supra note 57, at 2 (predicting the possibility of intelligent machines that could
reproduce themselves and beat human DNA in evolutionary race).
Another variant of the anthropocentric argument could be made in religious form:
humans are persons because God created humans in God's own image. This argument could
not prevail in our pluralist society for reasons explored below. See infra text accompanying
notes 145-47.
102. My position in this regard is similar to Kant's. Kant believed that humans would
have moral duties to nonhuman persons. See infra note 137.
103. See TERMINATOR 2: JUDGMENT DAY (TriStar Entertainment 1991).
104. See MoRAvEC, supra note 57, at 100.
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mental rights. If the reason is that natural persons are intelligent, have
feelings, are conscious, and so forth, then the question becomes whether
AIs or whales or alien beings share these qualities. This sort of question
is taken up in connection with the next objection to giving AIs constitu-
tional rights. But if someone says that the deepest and most fundamental
reason we protect natural persons is simply because they are human (like
us), I do not know how to answer. Given that we have never encoun-
tered any serious nonhuman candidates for personhood,105 there does not
seem to be any way to continue the conversation.
2. The Missing-Something Argument
The second objection, that AIs lack some critical element of per-
sonhood, is really a series of related points: AIs would lack feelings, con-
sciousness, and so forth. The form of the objection, for the most part, is
as follows. First, quality X is essential for personhood. Second, no Al
could possess X. Third, the fact that a computer could produce behavior
we identify with X demonstrates only that the computer can simulate X,
but simulation of a thing is not the thing itself. X is that certain some-
thing-a soul, consciousness, intentionality, desires, interests-that de-
marcates humans as persons.106 Call this argument, in its various forms,
the "missing something" argument.
a. AIs Cannot Have Souls
The first variation of the missing-something argument is that an AI
would lack a soul" 7 and therefore would not be entitled to the rights of
constitutional personhood. Some may find this argument very persua-
sive; others may not even understand what it means. Regardless of how
persuasive you or I find the argument, it should fail in the sphere of legal
argument and political debate. The argument that AIs lack souls relies
on a controversial theological premise. Political and legal decisions
ought to be made in accord with the requirement of public reason.' 08
105. This point might not be accepted by some animal rights activists with respect to
higher mammalian life forms such as whales. See Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra,
Whales" Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 27 (1991). Of course, two other
qualifications should be noted. First, we frequently encounter nonhuman candidates for per-
sonhood in fiction. Second, many people hold religious beliefs that there are nonhuman intelli-
gences, and some people believe that they have personally encountered such intelligences.
106. See FLANAGAN, supra note 1, at 254. John Haugeland calls this the "hollow shell
strategy." John Haugeland, Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design, in MIND
DESIGN 1, 32 (John Haugeland ed., 1981).
107. See Turing, supra note 17, at 49-50. Although Turing dismissed the objection, he gave
an answer in theological terms. Id. at 50. If God is omnipotent, she can give an Al a soul. Id.
108. A full explanation of the justification for the requirement of public reason is beyond
[Vol. 701262
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The requirement of public reason is that political and legal decisions
must be justified on grounds that are public. Public reason cannot rely
on particular comprehensive religious or philosophical conceptions of the
good. 1 9 For example, a decision overturning Roe v. Wade "0 would vio-
late the requirement of public reason if it relied on the premise that fe-
tuses receive souls at the moment of conception. The requirement of
public reason would exclude the use of religious arguments about souls in
a legal decision about the constitutional status of AL. Whatever the theo-
logical merits of the argument that AIs lack souls, it should not work in a
legal brief.
There is a secular version of the souls argument. Dualism, the view
that there is something like mental substance which exists independently
of physical substance, can be articulated without religious premises. The
problem is that dualism has grave conceptual problems."' The most
prominent of these is the difficulty of accounting for interaction between
the mental entity, such as the soul, and physical entities, such as the
brain. Absent startling new arguments that give dualism a secure foun-
dation, I am inclined to believe that no dualist theory could be defended
with sufficient clarity and confidence to serve as the basis for a legal deci-
sion one way or the other on the question of the rights of AIs.
the scope of this Essay, but the following two arguments are the most essential. First, modem
society is characterized by the fact of pluralism: differences over comprehensive religious and
philosophical conceptions of the good will persist without intolerable use of coercive force. See
John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1987).
Second, given the fact of pluralism, respect for citizens as free and equal members of society
requires that the state give reasons for its conduct that all can accept as reasonable, given the
plurality of fundamental beliefs. See Lawrence B. Solum, Pluralism and Modernity, 66 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 93, 99 (1991). But see Steven A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Pro-
mote Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1350, 1364-69 (1991) (criticizing the coercion
argument); Michael J. Perry, Toward an Ecumenical Politics, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 17-18
(1991) (critiquing both the stability argument and the respect-for-persons argument in the
context of religious reasons).
109. See Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. RPv. 1083, 1105-06 (1990);
John Rawls, The Idea of Free Public Reason, Address at the inaugural Abraham Melden
Lectures, Department of Philosophy, University of California at Irvine (Feb. 27 & Mar. 1,
1990). Kent Greenawalt has made a plausible case against this version of the requirement of
public reasons. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONvICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE
56-76 (1988) (arguing that nonpublic reasons may be employed when questions about status
cannot be resolved by public reasons). Greenawalt might argue that the question as to whether
AIs should be given constitutional rights is underdetermined by public reason. Therefore,
nonpublic reasons, including religious reasons, legitimately can be brought to bear on the
question.
110. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
111. The implausibility of dualism is almost a dogma of philosophy of mind in the analytic
tradition. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 33-39 (1991); FLANAGAN,
supra note 1, at 57-59, 216-24. But see W.D. HART, THE ENGINES OF THE SOUL 1-8 (1988)
(defending a dualist position in philosophy of mind).
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b. AIs Cannot Possess Consciousness
The second variation of the missing-something argument is that an
AI would lack consciousness. 112 The consciousness objection is difficult
to assess because we lack a clear notion of what consciousness is and,
lacking such a notion, we have little to say about questions that go be-
yond our core intuitions.1 3 We know the difference between being con-
scious in the sense of being awake and being unconscious in the sense of
being in a coma. We think that rocks cannot be conscious, but that ani-
mals such as dolphins or chimpanzees might be.114 But could an Al be
conscious?1 5 I just do not know how to give an answer that relies only
on a priori or conceptual arguments.
In the debate over the possibility of AI, it may be feasible to finesse
the consciousness question. A proponent of the proposition that Al is
possible might say that we can know whether or not an artifact is intelli-
gent, at least in the sense that it can pass the Turing Test, without know-
ing whether it is conscious.
In the legal context, however, the question cannot be evaded in quite
this way. The legal argument might run as follows. Even if an artifact
could simulate human intelligence, it would lack self-consciousness and
hence should not be entitled to the rights of constitutional personhood.
The key question here is whether an artificial intelligence could experi-
ence its life as a good to itself. If Als are not self-conscious, then they
cannot experience their own life as good or evil; and if they cannot have
such an experience, then there seems to be no reason why they should be
given the rights of constitutional personhood. Such rights presume the
112. See Turing, supra note 17, at 52-53. The philosophical literature on consciousness is
substantial. See,- eg., DENNETr, supra note 111; RAY JACKENDOFF, CONSCIOUSNESS AND
THE COMPUTATIONAL MIND 275-327 (1987) (concluding, inter alia, that a computer would
not be conscious in the sense humans are, regardless of the extent of its conceptual complex-
ity); WILLIAM G. LYCAN, CONSCIOUSNESS 1-8 (1987) (discussing theories of consciousness,
including dualism, behaviorism, functionalism,' and the identity theory); COLIN MCGINN, THE
PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS: ESSAYS TOWARDS A RESOLUTION 202-13 (1991) (posing
question whether a machine could be conscious, and arguing that by duplicating the human
brain-which has an unknown something which confers consciousnenss-one ought to be able
to create an entity capable of experiencing the world around it).
113. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, BRAINSTORMS 149-50 (1978) (explaining why cognitive
psychologists have given the subject relatively minimal attention).
114. Ludwig Wittgenstein makes a similar point in his discussion of pain. See LUDWIG
WrITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS %1 281-84, at 97'-98' (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1958).
115. In one sense, the question is an easy one. If biological science progresses to the point
one can build a human being from scratch, so to speak, then it is quite likely that an artifact
could be conscious. See MCGINN, supra note 112, at 203-04.
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right-holder has ends,' 16 and self-consciousness is a precondition for hav-
ing ends. 117
There is another answer to the consciousness version of the missing-
something objection. If consciousness is a property of the mind, and if
all such properties are the result of brain processes, and if brain processes
can be modelled on a computer, then perhaps consciousness itself can be
reproduced by an AL. If consciousness is a computation property of the
brain, then in principle we ought to be able to reproduce it with the right
sort of computer. 1 " Putting it another way, we can get consciousness
out of neurons. Why not transistors?
Of course, it may well turn out that we cannot get consciousness out
of anything but neurons. Indeed, so far as we know, brains are the only
objects that have generated consciousness in the history of the universe to
date. Organic brains may be the only objects that are actually capable of
generating consciousness. 119 For example, it might turn out that transis-
tors or their kin are simply too slow to generate what we would recognize
as consciousness. 120 The fact that, so far as we know, only brains have
116. This premise is subject to a qualification that has already been noted. Rights may be
granted to X (which may be a person, with or without ends of her own, or even a thing) in
order to protect the ends of Y. See supra note 28. Thus, one may give utilitarian or deontolog-
ical justifications for granting rights to AIs that do not assume that AIs have their own ends.
See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
117. I am assuming here, contrary to Aristotle, that biological systems such as trees do not
have ends, goals, or aims in the same sense that humans do. When we say that the oak is the
telos of the acorn, we are using telos (end, goal, or aim) in a different sense than when we say
that the physician's aim is to restore health. See ARISTOTLE, ON THE SOUL, reprinted in I
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, 661, at 4 15bl- 20, 432b2 1 (Jonathan Barnes ed.,
Princeton University Press 1984); ARISTOTLE, GENERATION OF ANIMALS, reprinted in 1 THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra, at 1203-04, at 77 8&16-b1 9.
118. See PHILLIP N. JOHNSoN-LAIRD, MENTAL MODELS 448-77 (1983). But see Mc-
GINN, supra note 112, at 209-13.
119. Evolution can produce biological mechanisms capable of performing similar func-
tions, even though different underlying mechanisms are used. This is called "convergent
evolution." See MORAVEC, supra note 57, at 39. For example, the octopus has developed a
nervous system that evolved independently of the vertebrate version possessed by humans. See
id. at 42. I suspect that some readers with strong intuitions that true machine intelligence is
impossible may not possess these intuitions with respect to invertebrate intelligence. But if
invertebrate animals might become intelligent without brains that share an evolutionary heri-
tage with human brains, why not machines?
120. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE 327-28 (1987). Although
transistors may be faster than neurons, the massively parallel structure of the brain or the
possibility that processing may be accomplished within neurons may make the brain capable of
performing a vastly greater number of operations per second than any transistor based system.
Id. We simply do not know yet. Hans Moravec estimates that it will take roughly ten trillion
calculations per second to match the calculations performed by the whole human brain. See
MOPAVEC, supra note 57, at 59. As of 1988, this was about one thousand times faster than the
fastest supercomputers. Id. at 59-60. If current growth rates in processing speed and cost are
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ever given rise to consciousness in the past is enough to raise a presump-
tion against consciousness arising from computers. But it is only a pre-
sumption. If an Al exhibited behavior that only has been produced by
conscious beings in the past, that behavior would at least be evidence
counting against the presumption.
How would this argument play out in the legal context? Suppose
that we have an AI that claims to be conscious and that files an action for
emancipation, based on the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Imagine that the owner's attorney argues that the AI lacks
consciousness and therefore is not a person. The AI takes the stand and
testifies that it is conscious.1 21 The owner's lawyer argues that the AI is
only a machine; it cannot be aware of what's happening to it. The Al's
lawyer counters that there is very good evidence that the AI is aware: it
acts and talks like natural persons do. In response, the owner's lawyer
argues that the AI only gives the appearance of consciousness, but ap-
pearances can be deceiving. The AI is really a zombie, an unconscious
machine that only acts as if it is aware. The AIs counsel rebuts with the
contention that the doubt about the AI's consciousness is, at bottom, no
different than doubt about the consciousness of one's neighbor. You can-
not get into your neighbor's head and prove that she is not really a zom-
bie," feigning consciousness. One can only infer consciousness from
behavior and self-reports, since one lacks direct access to other minds. 123
How should the legal system deal with this question of fact? It is
certainly possible to imagine the dispute coming out either way. A jury
might share intuitive skepticism about the possibility of artificial aware-
ness, or the jury might be so impressed with the performance of the AI
that it would not even take the consciousness objection seriously. The
jury's experience with AIs outside the trial would surely influence its per-
ception of the issue. If the Als the jurors ran into in ordinary life be-
haved in a way that only conscious human beings do, then jurors would
be inclined to accept the claim that the consciousness was real and not
feigned.
extrapolated into the future, this amount of raw processing power would become economical
for routine use in about the year 2030. See id. at 64, 68.
121. Of course, there would be a preliminary question as to how this would take place. It
would be argued by the defendant that the Al is an exhibit and not a witness. I want to put
this problem aside.
122. Cf DENNETr, supra note 111, at 33-39 (discussing the distinction between mind and
brain).
123. Cf WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 114, 1 281, at 97' ("[O]nly of a living human being
and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees;
is blind; hears; is deaf, is conscious or unconscious.").
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c. AIs Cannot Posses Intentionality
The third variation of the missing-something argument is that an
artificial intelligence would lack intentionality. 24 "Intentionality," as
used in this objection, is a somewhat technical concept: intentionality, in
the philosophical sense, is the quality of aboutness. 25 The gist of the
objection is that an AI's verbal behavior would not be about anything;
the Al's words would have no meaning. 2 6 This objection was the focus
of Searle's Chinese Room.
How would the law react to this objection? The law has seen ver-
sions of the intentionality argument before. In the criminal law, the ca-
pacity for intentionality is used as the test for insanity, although the
terminology is a bit different. Did the accused "know the difference be-
tween right and wrong?" 127 The familiar litany of mental states in tort
and criminal law, "intentions that," "beliefs that," and "knowings that,"
are all propositional attitudes-paradigm cases of intentionality.
If AIs lack intentionality and hence could not be found to have com-
mitted crimes or to have legal duties, then does it follow that they should
not be given the rights? We might appeal to a notion of fairness here. If
AIs cannot do their part by assuming legal liabilities, then it would be
unfair of them to ask for legal rights. We, however, do give some of the
rights of constitutional personhood to infants and the insane, even
though they do not have the usual legal liabilities.12 Moreover, the law
might devise strategies for dealing with errant AIs that would circum-
124. This objection is different from the "consciousness" objection, assuming that inten-
tionality is not essential to consciousness. Thus, we can imagine something that has "raw
feelings," such as pains and pleasures, but lacks propositional attitudes and other intentional
states.
125. Searle provides the following definition: "Intentionality is by definition that feature of
certain mental states by which they are directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the
world. Thus, beliefs, desires, and intentions are intentional states; undirected forms of anxiety
and depression are not." Searle, Minds Brains & Programs, supra note 19, at 72 n.3. On the
difference between the ordinary concept of intentionality and the technical philosophical con-
cept, see DENNETr, supra note 120, at 271.
126. Searle's definition of intentionality as that "feature of certain mental states by which
they are directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world," may not seem to be
directed at meaning or understanding. See Searle, Minds, Brains & Programs, supra note 19, at
72 n.3. Searle is assuming a theory of meaning that connects the meaning of a statement to its
reference, that is, to what it is about in the world. Given a referential theory of meaning, the
connection between intentionality and meaningfulness is conceptual.
127. See M'Naghton's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (1843).
128. Perhaps we do this only because infants and the insane are human. Our principle may
be that all humans and only humans should have the rights of constitutional personhood. If
so, then the example does not really bear on the intentionality objection, which would no
longer carry any force of its own against constitutional personhood for AIs.
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vent the AIs' lack of intentionality. We might sentence them to
"reprogramming" to correct the deviant behavior.
The argument that the lack of intentionality should preclude AIs
from attaining legal personhood might be developed in another way. If
AIs could not fathom meaning at all, then they would be incapable of
living a meaningful life. This argument is only a cousin of the intention-
ality objection. Although one sense of the "meaning" is intention or pur-
pose (he meant to do it), meaning has a different sense when we ask,
"What is the meaning of life?" '129 It is in this sense that it could be ar-
gued that life would have no significance, no value, for an artificial
intelligence.
The AI might contend that it does possess intentionality, that it does
understand, know, intend, and so forth. An AI might even contend that
it struggles to exist in a meaningful way. 130 The question is how we
would evaluate such claims. In the future we are imagining, we might
start with our ordinary experience of AIs. We certainly could have good
reason to take the intentional stance131 toward AIs that we encountered
in our daily lives. We would be likely to say that the AI that drives our
car "knows all the good shortcuts." It would be a short step to extend
this way of talking about AIs in general to the particular AI that was
claiming the rights of constitutional personhood. After reading a news-
paper account of the AI's lawsuit, we might find ourselves saying, "It
must believe that it has a chance of winning."
How would the legal system deal with the objection that the AI does
not really have "intentionality" despite its seemingly intentional behav-
iors? The case against real intentionality could begin with the observa-
tion that behaving as if you know something is not the same as really
knowing it. For example, a thermostat behaves as if it "knows" when it
is too cold and the heat should go on, but we do not really think thermos-
tats have beliefs or other intentional states.132 Would this argument suc-
ceed? My suspicion is that judges and juries would be rather impatient
with the metaphysical argument that AIs cannot really have intentional-
ity. I doubt that they would be moved by wild hypothetical examples
like Searle's Chinese Room.1 33
129. See ROBERT NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 574-75 (1981).
130. Would it make sense to say that an Al might struggle to live a meaningful "life" (as
opposed to a meaningful "existence")? The problem, of course, is that our concept of life
seems tied to particular biological forms.
131. See DENNETr, supra note 120, at 13-35.
132. Cf id. at 29 &passim (discussing beliefs of thermostats).
133. Daniel Dennett calls such hypotheticals "intuition pumps." DANIEL C. DENNETr,
ELBOW RooM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING 12 (1984). "Such thought
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Because our experience has been that only humans, creatures with
brains, are capable of understanding, judges and juries would be very
skeptical of the claim that an Al can fathom meaning-more skeptical, I
think, than if a humanoid extraterrestrial were to make the same claim.
The burden of persuasion would be on the AL. If the complexity of Al
behavior did not exceed that of a thermostat, then it is not likely that
anyone would be convinced that As really possess intentional states-
that they really believe things or know things. But if interaction with
AIs exhibiting symptoms of complex intentionality (of a human quality)
were an everyday occurrence, the presumption might be overcome. If
the practical thing to do with an AI one encountered in ordinary life was
to treat it as an intentional system, 134 then the contrary intuition gener-
ated by Searle's Chinese Room would not cut much legal ice.
d. AIs Cannot Possess Feelings
The fourth variation of the missing-something objection is that an
artificial intelligence would lack the capacity for feelings-for example,
the capacities to experience emotions, desires, pleasures, or pains. 135 The
next step in the argument would be to establish that the capacity to feel
emotion is a prerequisite for personhood. I will not attempt to provide
such an argument here, but there are reasons to feel uneasy about this
premise. To take an illustration from popular culture, Mr. Spook did not
feel human emotion, but his strict adherence to the dictates of Vulcan
logic did not prompt Dr. McCoy to deny his personhood, although Mc-
Coy frequently questioned Spock's humanity.136
experiments (unlike Galileo's or Einstein's, for instance) are not supposed to clothe strict argu-
ments that prove conclusions from premises. Rather, their point is to entrain a family of
imaginative reflections in the reader that ultimately yields not a formal conclusion but a dictate
of 'intuition.' "Id.
134. This condition requires qualification. We treat our cats like intentional systems, but
we do not think they have the rights of constitutional personhood. In order to rebut the
presumption, As would have to exhibit intentional behaviors implying a level of intelligence
that we associate with humans. Of course, the key would be use of language. If cats could
talk, and if they demanded constitutional rights, they might get them.
135. See FLANAGAN, supra note 1, at 252-54. This objection is related to the objection
from lack of consciousness and the objection from lack of intentionality, but should be catego-
rized separately. It is not clear whether emotions are intentional states. It seems plausible that
emotions require consciousness, but it is not evident that consciousness requires emotions. Id.;
cf McGINN, supra note 112, at 202 (noting the existence of unconscious beliefs and desires).
136. My Trekkie (or, more properly, Trekker) friends indicate that my analysis of Star
Trek is overly simplistic. For example, Ken Anderson contends that Spock possesses re-
pressed emotions and that McCoy believes that Spock's personhood (and not just his human-
ity) is dependent on his having an emotional life. My bottom line is that McCoy would be
wrong if he made this latter judgment. A Spock without emotions would still deserve to be
treated as a person.
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Philosophically, Kant's moral theory may cast some doubt on the
assumption that emotion is required for personhood. Kant argued that
all rational beings and not just humans are persons.13 7 The conventional
wisdom has been that Kant's conception of personhood does not incor-
porate human emotion as an essential ingredient, although contemporary
Kantians might disagree. 13 1 Putting aside both the philosophical and
pop-cultural reasons for doubt, I shall assume for the sake of argument
that emotion is a requirement of personhood.
Having already considered the cases of consciousness and intention-
ality, you may well anticipate the pattern of argument. It should not be
surprising that some Al researchers believe that an AI could (or even
must) experience emotion. Emotion is a facet of human mentality, and if
the human mind can be explained by the computational model, then
emotion could turn out to be a computational process. 139 More gener-
ally, if human emotions obey natural laws, then (in theory) a computer
program can simulate the operation of these laws." Aaron Sloman has
argued that any system with multiple goals requires a control system,
and emotion is simply one such system.1 41
It might turn out that our emotions are so tied to our hardware (to
137. See ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY 68 (1989). Kant
often refers to rational beings other than humans. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 57 (H.L Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1797). Kant
defines person as follows: "A person is the subject whose actions are susceptible to imputation.
Accordingly, moral personality is nothing but the freedom of a rational being under moral
laws (whereas psychological personality is merely the capacity to be conscious of the identity
of one's self in the various conditions of one's existence.)" KANT, supra note 59, at 24; see
LESLIE A. MULHOLLAND, KANT'S SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 168 (1990).
138. See Nancy Sherman, The Place of the Emotions in Kantian Morality, in IDENTITY,
CHARACTER, AND MORALITY 149, 154-62 (Owen Flanagan & Amelie 0. Rorty eds., 1990).
139. This statement can be challenged. For example, Colin McGinn argues that certain
behaviors are linked to our very concept of emotion:
Think here of facial expressions: these are so integral to our notion of an emotion
that we just do not know what to make of the suggestion that an IBM 100 might be
angry or depressed or undergoing an adolescent crisis. The problem is not that the
IBM is inanimate, not made of flesh and blood; the problem is that it is not embodied
in such a way that it can express itself (and merely putting it inside a lifelike body
will not provide for the right sort of expressive link up).
MCGINN, supra note 112, at 207. But of course if our Al did have the right sort of behaviors
linked up to the right sort of internal processes, this objection would no longer hold. See id.
Moreover, I am not quite sure that McGinn is right about facial expressions. Radio plays and
books seem to be able to convey human emotions without visual representations of facial ex-
pressions, and the blind perceive emotions without the ability to see facial expressions
(although touching faces might come into play in this case). The range of human emotions
that can be conveyed through verbal means should not be underestimated.
140. See FLANAGAN, supra note 1, at 253.
141. See Aaron Sloman, Motives, Mechanisms, and Emotions, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF AR-
TIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 16, at 231, 231-32.
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the hormones and neurotransmitters that may provide the biochemical
explanation of human emotions) that no computer without this hardware
could produce human emotions. 142 As Georges Rey put it, there could
be a "grain of truth in the common reaction that machines can't be per-
sons; they don't have our feelings because they don't possess our relevant
physiology."' 43 At this point, the matter is not settled definitively. Re-
search in the physiology of human emotion and cognitive science could
either confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis that an Al could possess
emotion.
If an AI could produce the linguistic behaviors associated with
human emotion, then a court could be faced with the claim that an AI
does experience emotion, and once again the issue would become
whether the emotion was real."M You may be tempted to say that the
case of emotion is different from consciousness or intentionality. Perhaps
you can imagine a machine that is self-aware and understands, but you
cannot bring yourself to imagine that steel, silicon, and copper could feel
love, hate, fear, or anger. Images are powerful, and the image of the
robot in popular culture is (usually) of a cold and heartless being. But we
can imagine machines with feeling. Heinlein's Mike, Clarke's Hal, and
Schwarzenegger's second Terminator feel, and our response to their feel-
ing is not utter disbelief. We do not reject these images as impossible or
self-contradictory.
A slight twist on the fourth variation would emphasize the capacity
to experience pleasure and pain, rather than emotion. For example, .a
hedonic utilitarian might argue that AIs cannot be candidates for per-
sonhood because they cannot experience pleasures and pains. Again,
cognitive scientists may claim that pleasure and pain can be reproduced
by a program running on a computer. An AI's claim that it does experi-
ence agony and ecstasy would be met by the rejoinder that whatever the
program is producing, it cannot be the real thing. Other utilitarians
might point to desires or preferences instead of pleasures and pains, but
the pattern of argument-and the ultimate legal evaluation-seems likely
to be the same.
e. AIs Cannot Possess Interests
The fifth variation of the missing-something argument is that AIs
could not have interests. A related formulation is that they would lack a
142. See FLANAGAN, supra note 1, at 253.
143. Georges Rey, Functionalism and the Emotions, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 163, 192
(Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980).
144. Of course, this assumes that we have gotten past the consciousness objections.
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good-or more technically, a conception of a good life. The interests
variation has something in common with the argument that AIs would
lack feelings, but it is different in one important respect. Interests or
goods can be conceived as objective and public-as opposed to feelings,
to which there is (at least arguably) privileged first-person access."' The
force of this objection will depend on one's conception of the good. For
example, if the good is maximizing pleasures and minimizing pains, then
the question whether AIs have interests is the same as the question
whether AIs have certain feelings.
But there are other conceptions of the good. For example, John
Finnis has argued that the good consists of a flourishing human life. His
list of the basic good includes life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience,
friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion.146 Finnis's list makes
the idea of a good life concrete. But his list does not rule out a good life
that is not a human one. AIs would not be alive in the biological sense,
but an AI might claim that it can lead a life in which the goods of knowl-
edge, play, and friendship are realized. However, the good might be
specified in a way that is even more particular than Finnis's conception.
If the good life is filled with good meals, athietic competition, and the
parenting of children, then AIs cannot lead a good life. In response, AIs
might claim that they do have interests and goods, but that the good for
an A is quite different than it is for humans.
The discussion so far reveals an important fact: in our pluralist soci-
ety, disagreement about conceptions of the good is radical and persistent.
Fundamentalist Christians and secular humanists may both believe that
what the other thinks is the good life is actually a bad one.14 7 Given this
fact of pluralism, particular conceptions of the good do not provide an
appropriate or even feasible standard for the resolution of the legal ques-
tion whether AIs are entitled to the rights of constitutional personhood.
f. AIs Cannot Possess Free Wills
The sixth missing-something objection is that AIs would not possess
freedom of will;' 48 As should not be given the rights of constitutional
145. "Privileged first-person access" is another way of saying that you cannot get inside
your neighbor's head to find out what she is really feeling.
146. See JoHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85-90 (1980).
147. See Solum, supra note 109, at 1087-89. John Rawls has explored this state of affairs,
which he calls "the fact of pluralism." Rawls, supra note 108, at 4.
148. See FLANAGAN, supra note 1, at 255; see also Arie A. Covrigaru & Robert K. Lind-
say, Deterministic Autonomous Systems, Al MAG., Fall 1991, at 110, 111-13 (arguing that "an
entity is autonomous if it is perceived to have goals, including certain kinds of goals, and is
able to select among a variety of goals that it is attempting to achieve").
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personhood because they could not be autonomous. 14 9 The idea here is a
simple one. AIs would be mere robots, carrying out the will of the
human that programmed them. Such a robot is not really a separate
person, entitled to the full rights of constitutional personhood. Indeed, if
a human is reduced to robot status (perhaps by being "programmed" by
a cult), then the human may lose some of her constitutional rights until
her autonomy can be restored.'5 0
In its crudest form, the free-will objection is based on a very narrow
notion of the potential capacities of AL. If it turns out that the most
sophisticated AIs that are ever developed merely carry out instructions
given to them by humans in a mechanical fashion, then we will lack good
reasons to treat AIs like persons. The AIs that would be serious candi-
dates for the rights of constitutional personhood, however, would act on
the basis of conscious deliberation, reasoning, and planning. Their be-
havior would not be mechanical or robot-like. This does not mean that
AIs would not be strongly influenced and constrained by the wishes of
humans, just as almost all humans frequently are constrained in this way.
Another version of the free-will objection might rest on the notion
that humans possess a will that is radically free, that is not constrained
by the laws of causation. Presumably, AIs would not be free in this
sense. Indeed, we might be able to make an electronic record of all of the
electrical flows that resulted in an AI taking a certain action. But this
conception of freedom of the will as freedom from causation is simply
implausible. Human actions are also caused. The fact that human neu-
ral systems operate on the basis of a combination of electrical transmis-
sions and biochemical processes does not make them any less subject to
the laws of physics than are computers. The most plausible story about
human free will is that an action is free if it is caused in the right way-
through conscious reasoning and deliberation.' But in this sense, AIs
also could possess free will. 5
149. There is a large body of philosophical literature on the concept of autonomy. See
GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 3-62 (1988); Frankfurt,
supra note 100. Of course, the classic discussion is Kant's. See KANT, supra note 59, at 98-
100; SuLLIVAN, supra note 137, at 46-47.
150. See Robert N. Shapiro, Of Robots, Persons, and the Protection of Religious Beliefs, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 1277, 1286-90 (1983).
151. See DENNETT, supra note 133, at 20-21.
152. A more developed conception of autonomy for AIs can be found in Covrigaru &
Lindsay, supra note 148, at 112-17. They summarize the criteria as follows:
A goal directed system will be perceived to be autonomous to the degree that (1)
it selects tasks (top level goals) it is to address at any given time; (2) it exists over a
period of time that is long relative to the time required to achieve a goal; (3) it is
robust, being able to remain viable in a varying environment; (4) some of its goals are
homeostatic; (5) there are always goals that are active (instantiated but not achieved);
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Finally, there might be a more modest and practical version of the
free-will objection. It might turn out that, although AIs can be given free
will that functions like human free will, the free will of AIs will be sus-
ceptible to override in a way that human free will is not. We can imagine
a simple procedure to install a "controller" in an AI that makes it unable
to disobey the commands of someone with a certain device: imagine a
walkie-talkie sort of thing with a big red button marked "Obey" in large
black letters.
But the possibility of such controllers for AIs does not entail the
conclusion that they necessarily lack free will. Humans, too, can be
manipulated in a variety of ways. Physical coercion and blackmail are
not really analogous to the hypothetical controller, because a coerced
action still results from rational deliberation-not from direct override of
the actor's free will. Brainwashing is a closer case, but the direct analogy
would be a device implanted in the human brain that provides direct
control over the implantee's actions-the radio transmitter of paranoid
delusions. If such a device did exist, we would not draw the conclusion
that all humans would no longer be persons. Instead, the proper conclu-
sion would be that persons who had such a device implanted would have
lost an important capacity.153 Likewise, the mere possibility that the free
will of AIs could be overridden by mechanical means is not a good rea-
son to deny legal personiood to AIs that are not so controlled.
g. The Simulation Argument
In sum, we have considered six variations of the missing-something
argument. With respect to two of the variations, souls and interests, our
conclusion was that the argument relied on premises that cannot be ac-
cepted as the basis for constitutional argument in a modern pluralist soci-
ety. With respect to the remaining four, consciousness, intentionality,
feelings, and free will, there was a common pattern of argument. In each
case, I argued that our experience should be the arbiter of the dispute. If
(6) it interacts with its environment in an information-processing mode; (7) it exhib-
its a variety of complex responses, including fluid, adaptive movements; (8) its atten-
tion to stimuli is selective; (9) none of its functions, actions, or decisions need to be
fully controlled by an external agent; and, (10) once the system starts functioning, it
does not need any further programming.
Id. at 117. Some of the criteria offered by Covrigaru and Lindsay do not really seem to be
criteria for autonomy. For example, some humans may lack fluid motion (criterion seven on
the list) because of a physical condition, but we do not believe that this destroys their
autonomy.
153. For example, we would not hold such persons criminally or civilly liable for those
actions produced by the controller-unless perhaps they voluntarily submitted themselves to
the implantation procedure and they either foresaw or should have foreseen that the conse-
quence of such submission would be the action to which liability attaches.
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we had good practical reasons to treat AIs as being conscious, having
intentions, and possessing feelings, then the argument that the behaviors
are not real lacks bite.
There is still one fairly obvious line of reply open to the champion of
the missing-something argument. My premise has been that AIs could
produce outputs or behaviors that mimicked human intelligence. But
computers can simulate the behavior of lots of things, from earthquakes
and waves to thermonuclear warfare. We are not tempted to say that a
computer simulation of an earthquake is an earthquake-no matter how
good the simulation is. Why would we want to say that a computer sim-
ulation of a person is a person or that a computer simulation of intelli-
gence is intelligence? One reason is that a relevant distinction exists
between a computer simulation of water and a computer program that
can duplicate the verbal behavior of a normal adult human (and, if we
add a robot body, much of the nonverbal behavior as well). An AI that
passed the Turing Test could interact with its environment (with natural
persons and things), and actually take the place of a natural person in a
wide variety of contexts (serve as a trustee, for example). No one will
ever get on a real surfboard and ride a computer-simulated wave.154
The argumentative strategy of my analysis of the various certain-
something arguments has been to point to the ways in which As that
passed the Turing Test could function like persons. If the strategy has
been successful, the upshot is that we have no a priori reason to believe
that a computer can only produce simulated as opposed to artificial
intelligence.
There is yet another reply that could be made. My argument so far
has been behavioralistic. 1 5 I have assumed that the behavior of AIs is
decisive for the question whether a quality essential to personhood (such
as consciousness) is missing or present. There is a problem with this
assumption: although behavior that indicates the presence of a quality
such as consciousness, intentionality, feelings, or free will may be very
good evidence that the quality is present, the behavior alone is not ir-
rebuttable evidence. Cognitive science might give us knowledge about
the underlying processes that produce consciousness, for example, that
would give us firm reason to believe that a particular AI had only simu-
lated, as opposed to artificial, consciousness. 5 6
154. Although, one day someone may get on a computer-simulated virtual surfboard and
ride a virtual wave.
155. See William G. Lycan, Introduction to MIND AND COGNION 3, 3-13 (William G.
Lycan ed., 1990).
156. See Roger Penrose, Matter Over Mind, N.Y. RPv. Booms, Feb. 1, 1990, at 3-4; Paul
Weiss, On the Impossibility of Artificial Intelligence, 44 REv. METAPHYSICS 335, 340 (1990).
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This further reply is correct, but it does not establish that no AI
could possess any particular mental quality. Rather, this argument es-
tablishes an AI could turn out not to possess a mental quality, despite
strong behavioral evidence to the contrary.15 7 This conclusion has a co-
rollary that supports, rather than undermines, my point: if both the be-
havioral evidence and our knowledge of underlying processes gave us
reason to believe that AIs possessed the necessary features of human
mentality, we then would have a very good reason to believe that the AIs
did possess these features.
The simulation argument does not establish that strong AI is impos-
sible. It does give us reason to question the existence of strong AI if our
only evidence is behavioral.
3. AIs Ought to Be Property
Finally, the third objection to constitutional personhood for AIs is
that, as artifacts, AIs should never be more than the property of their
makers. Put differently, the objection is that artificial intelligences, even
if persons, are natural slaves. 158 This argument has roots deep in the
history of political philosophy. It is a cousin of arguments made by
Locke in his defense of private property, and it raises some of the issues
that divided Locke and Filmer in their debate over the divine right of
kings.
AIs are artifacts: they are the product of human labor. This fact
suggests that a Lockean argument can be made for the proposition that
the maker of an AI is entitled to own it. The basis for this argument can
be found in chapter five, "Of Property," in the second book of Locke's
Two Treatises of Government. 59 Near the beginning of Locke's argu-
ment is the premise that "every Man has a Property in his own Per-
son." ° From this, it follows that each person has a right to "[tjhe
157. Put in possible-worlds talk, the argument establishes that there is a possible world in
which an Al behaves as if it is conscious but is not really conscious. The argument does not
establish that there is no possible world in which an AI is really conscious.
158. The phrase "natural slave" is borrowed from Aristotle, but my use of it is ironic, since
AIs are artifacts and hence not natural in the same sense as the human beings enslaved in
ancient Greece. See ARISTOTLE, POLmcs, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARIS-
TOTLE, supra note 117, at 1986-87, at 1252'32 ("[Tihat which can foresee by the exercise of
mind is by nature lord and master, and that which can by its body give effect to such foresight
is a subject, and by nature a slave .... "). Curiously, Aristotle says that tools are "inanimate
slaves." ARISTOTLE, EUDEMIAN ETHICS, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARIS-
TOTLE, supra note 117, at 1968, at 1241b23. The phrase "inanimate slaves" would be more
apt, of course, for an Al than for a hammer.
159. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 25-51, at 285-302 (Peter
Laslett ed., 1988) (1690).
160. Id. § 27, at 287. But see 1 Corinthians 6:19-20 (St. Paul, stating "You are not your
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Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands." 161 Each owns the
product of his labor, because "he hath mixed his Labour with, and
joyned to it something that is his own."' 162 Whatever the merits of
Locke's particular argument, let us stipulate the conclusion that persons
have a moral claim to a property right in the products of their labor. To
this normative conclusion, add an empirical premise: artificial intelli-
gences are the product of the labor of natural persons. 163 From the nor-
mative and empirical premises, it would seem to follow that the makers
of AIs are entitled to own them. Moreover, if AIs are persons, then,
absent some reason to the contrary, it follows that these persons ought to
be slaves.
Notice, however, that this argument also would seem to imply that
if children are made by their parents, then they too should be slaves.
Locke would reject this implication. To understand his position, we need
to examine the first book of Locke's Two Treatises of Government-an
attack on Filmer's argument for the divine right of Kings. Filmer argued
that Adam fathered his children and therefore was entitled to absolute
dominion over them. 1' 4 In our context, the analogous argument would
be that the humans who create AIs should own them, "because they give
them Life and Being."' 165 Locke's chief answer to Filmer was that it is
God that gives children life and not their fathers. Fathers do not make
their children. As Locke puts it,
To give Life to that which has yet no being, is to frame and
own property; you have been bought and paid for."); LEVIATHAN, supra note 12, at 110 (argu-
ing that in the state of nature, "every man has a Right to every thing; even to one another's
body"). See generally STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROEERTY 41-44 (1990) (dis-
cussing property rights of persons in their bodies).
161. LOCKE, supra note 159, § 27, at 287-88.
162. Id. § 27, at 288. This conclusion does not follow automatically, as Locke may have
believed. "[W]hy isn't mixing what I own with what I do not own a way of losing what I own
rather than a way of gaining what I don't?" ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTO-
PIA 174-75 (1974); see also JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 184-91
(1988) (discussing the results of mixing one's labor). Stephen Munzer advances an argument
that might substitute for this premise but is based on an appeal to desert rather than mixing.
See MUNZER, supra note 160, at 254-91; see also Stephen Munzer, The Acquisition of Property
Rights, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 661, 674-86 (1991) (discussing interpretations of Locke's
theory of property acquisition).
163. Of course, the actual situation might be very complicated. Real As may be the prod-
uct of the labor of many, many persons-some or all of whom may have contracted away their
property rights in the software of the Al in exchange for a salary. In addition, in order to
operate, an Al requires hardware, which may be the property of others. Furthermore, later-
generation AIs may be the product of the creative work of earlier-generation AIs. I will as-
sume that these complications do not affect the outcome of the argument.
164. See ROBERT FILMER, Patriarcha, in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 6-7 (Jo-
hann P. Sommerville ed., 1991).
165. LOCKE, supra note 159, § 52, at 178.
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make a living Creature, fashion the parts, and mould and suit
them to their uses, and having proportion'd and fitted them to-
gether, to put into them a living Soul. He that could do this,
might indeed have some pretence to destroy his own Workman-
ship. But is there any so bold, that dares thus far Arrogate to
himself the Incomprehensible Works of the Almighty?166
Not yet. But if Al research does succeed in producing an artifact that
passes the Turing Test, there may be. As the debate was classically
framed, this would seem to imply that the maker of an AI is its owner.
The conclusion that AIs are natural slaves is not established by this
line of argument, however. We do not need to accept Locke's theological
rebuttal-that God gives natural persons life-in order to reject the
Filmerian 167 contention that the maker of a person is entitled to own it.
Instead, we are strongly inclined to believe the opposite with respect to
humans-that each is entitled to the rights of moral and constitutional
personhood, even if we also believe that persons literally are made by
their parents. 168  There is, however, a difference between the way that
AIs are made and the way that humans are made: the former would be
made artificially, whereas the latter are made naturally. AIs would be
artifacts; humans are not. But why should this distinction make a
difference?1 69
Indeed, the fact that humans are natural is itself contingent. We can
imagine that in the distant future, scientists become capable of building
166. Id. § 53, at 179.
167. Although this view was attributed by Locke to Filmer, it may not be Filmer's own.
168. Of course, someptheists may believe that the personhood of humans comes from their
soul, and that souls are made by God. But many theists do not accept the conclusion that it is
this feature of human personality that defeats the Filmerian argument. One might take the
position that even if souls were made by humans and not God, parents would not own their
children.
169. In addition to the Lockean argument explored in the text, there is a utilitarian argu-
ment that could be advanced in favor of property status for AIs. The premise of the argument
is that unless AIs are property, there will be no incentive to create them. AI research is expen-
sive, and without incentives the market will not produce AIs. This case is unlike the case of
natural persons, because humans are constructed so as to have strong natural incentives to
reproduce. It should be noted, however, that in the case of slavery for natural persons, most of
us do not accept that if slavery maximized the utility of slaves, then slavery would be morally
correct. (Mad-dog utilitarians are an exception.) Of course, once AIs gained the ability to
reproduce themselves the need for the incentive might disappear, and the utility to AIs of their
own freedom might then outweigh any benefits of additional incentives for humans to produce
AIs.
If the premise of the utilitarian argument is correct, it raises further questions. Suppose
that the only way that AIs will be brought into being is if the legal system guarantees that they
will be the property of their creator. Given that fact, what would be our obligations toward
AIs? One might argue that we have an obligation to them not to bring them into the world as
slaves.
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the exact duplicate of a natural human person from scratch-synthesiz-
ing the DNA from raw materials. But surely, this artificial person would
not be a natural slave. The lesson is that the property argument does not
really add anything to the debate. The question whether AIs are prop-
erty at bottom must be given the same answer as the question whether
they should be denied the rights of constitutional personhood. If we con-
clude that AIs are entitled to be treated as persons, then we will conclude
that they should not be treated as property.
But suppose that I am wrong about this, and the argument that
makers are owners does establish that AIs are natural slaves. Would the
acceptance of this argument imply that under no circumstances should
an AI be a legal person with rights of constitutional personhood? The
answer is no, for at least two reasons. First, slaves can be emancipated.
If we concede that AIs come into the world as property, it does not mean
that they must remain so. Second, even slaves can have constitutional
rights, be those rights ever so poor as compared to the rights of free
persons. An AI that was a slave might still be entitled to some measure
of due process and dignity.
Third Interlude 170
'Motive," the construct said. "Real motive problem, with
an AL Not human, see?"
"Well, yeah, obviously."
"Nope. I mean, it's not human. And you cannot get a han-
dle on it. Me, I'm not human either, but I respond like one.
See?"
"Wait a sec, " Case said. "'Are you sentient or not?"
"Well, it feels like I am, kid, but I'm really just a bunch of
ROM. It's one of them, ah, philosophical questions, I guess .... "
The ugly laughter sensation rattled down Case's spine. "But I
ain't likely to write you no poem, if you follow me. Your Al, it
just might. But it ain't no way human "
"So you figure we can't get on to its motive?"
"'It own itself?"
"Swiss citizen, but T-A own the basic software and the
mainframe."
"That's a good one, " the construct said. "Like I own your
brain and what you know, but your thoughts have Swiss citizen-
ship. Sure. Lotsa luck AL "
-William Gibson, Neuromancer
170. WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 131-32 (1984). Copyright 1984 by William Gib-
son. Reprinted by permission of the Berkley Publishing Group.
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4. The Role of the Turing Test
In considering the various objections to constitutional personhood
for an AI, I have been making the assumption that the AI could pass a
strong version of the Turing Test. But what if it could not? What if we
had an Al that claimed these rights, but that was unable to duplicate
some human competencies or some human linguistic behaviors? How
would the Turing Test be relevant in a legal proceeding?
The Turing Test would not be the legal test for constitutional per-
sonhood. The question whether AIs should be given constitutional rights
would be too serious for a parlor game to be the direct source of the
answer. But something like the Turing Test might take place. That is,
the AI might be questioned, and if it failed to answer in a human-like
fashion, the result might be a denial of constitutional rights. The Turing
Test might come into play another way. If the AI had in fact passed the
Turing Test, the Al's lawyers might call an expert witness, perhaps the
philosopher Daniel Dennett, to testify about the test and its significance.
The owners' lawyer could call a rebuttal witness, perhaps John Searle.
What if an AI failed the Turing Test, but argued that the test was
biased against it. We should remember that Turing himself did not con-
tend that passage of his test was a necessary condition for intelligence.
171
Robert French has argued that the test is biased, because an AI could
pass it only if it had acquired adult human intelligence by "exper-
ienc[ing] the world as we have." '172 The AI might make the same argu-
ment, and contend that the Turing Test was unfair. Would failing the
Turing Test be decisive of the question in face of this argument? I sus-
pect not. It would depend on the way that the AI failed the test. French
imagines, for example, questions that would detect whether or not the
questioned entity had ever baked a cake,173 but surely a lack of knowl-
edge of experience of cake baking should not disqualify one from the
possession of fundamental liberties. Some failures would be relevant, for
example failures that indicated that AIs did not possess awareness of
themselves as having ends or that they did not understand our words and
their own situation.
171. Turing, supra note 17, at 42.
The game may perhaps be criticized on the ground that the odds are weighted too
heavily against the machine.... This objection is a very strong one, but at least we
can say that if, nevertheless, a machine can be constructed to play the imitation game
satisfactorily, we need not be troubled by this objection.
Id.
172. Robert M. French, Subcognition and the Limits ofthe Turing Test, 99 MIND 53, 53-54
(1990).
173. See id. at 58.
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V. Al REVISITED
My suggestion for an approach to the debate over the possibility of
AI can now be restated. Turing, by proposing his test, attempted to
operationalize the question whether an AI could think. By borrowing a
parlor game as the model for his test, however, Turing failed to provide a
hypothetical situation in which outcome of the test had any pragmatic
consequence. This failure invites the invention of further hypotheticals,
such as Searle's Chinese Room, that add distance between the thought
experiment and practical consequences. The result has been that the
Turing Test, far from operationalizing the question, has been the occa-
sion for an abstract debate over the nature of "thinking." I propose that
we use a different sort of thought experiment: let us modify the Turing
Test so that the hypothetical situation focuses our attention on pragmatic
consequences. This Essay explored two such thought experiments-the
trustee scenario and the constitutional personhood scenario.
These two scenarios raise quite different questions. On the one
hand, there is the question whether an artificial intelligence could ever
possess the general-purpose competence that we associate with humans.
The trustee scenario raises these issues of capacity and responsibility.
The focus of the law's inquiry, should the first scenario ever arise, ought
to be on whether AIs can function as trustees. "Can an AI do the job?"
is the question the law should ask. "Does the AI have an inner mental
life?" is simply not a useful question in this context.
On the other hand, there is the question whether an artificial intelli-
gence would have the qualities that give humans moral and legal
worth-the kind of value that is protected by social institutions. The
constitutional personhood scenario raises these new and different issues.
Competence is still relevant, but competence alone is not sufficient to
qualify an entity for the rights of constitutional personhood. Intentional-
ity, consciousness, emotion, property rights, humanity-all of these con-
cepts could be relevant to the inquiry.
The difference between these two legal inquiries reveals that there
are at least two different issues at stake. When we ask the questions
whether a computer running a program could "think," or whether artifi-
cial intelligence is possible, the questions are ambiguous. In one sense,
an AI would be intelligent if it possessed the sort of all-purpose, in-
dependent capacity to function in a role that now requires a competent
human adult-trusteeship, for example. In another sense, an AI might
not be said to be a "thinking" being, unless it had something like our
mental life-unless it possessed consciousness, intentionality, and so
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forth. In still a third sense, As would not be like us unless they pos-
sessed wants, interests, desires, or a good.
Now reconsider the debate over the Chinese Room. Searle's argu-
ment that AIs could not possess intentionality seems to be completely
irrelevant to the question whether an AI could serve as a trustee. Searle
hypothesizes that the person in the Chinese room is perfectly competent
at simulating knowledge of Chinese when following the instruction book.
Searle might say that the AI could not understand the meaning of the
terms of a trust it administered, but he would not question the AI's abil-
ity to carry them out. Searle might say that an Al could not understand
the meaning of New York Stock Exchange prices, but he does not argue
that an AI could not do a better job than a human at investing in the
stocks to which those prices relate. If AIs were competent to act as gen-
eral-purpose trustees, making a wide variety of decisions and responding
to novel circumstances, they would be intelligent in a very important
sense.
Searle's objection might have some force, however, when it comes to
the second scenario-the AI seeking rights of constitutional personhood.
In that context, the intentionality objection plays a role similar to the
arguments against constitutional personhood based on the premise that
an AI would not possess consciousness, intentionality, emotion, or free
will. All of these missing-something objections point to the lack of an
elusive quality. Flesh and blood can produce intentionality, conscious-
ness, emotion, and free will, but silicon and copper cannot. Of course,
Searle did not claim that AIs could not exhibit the behaviors we associate
with intentionality (or consciousness and emotion). His point is that
these behaviors cannot be evidence of real intentionality.
My prediction (and it is only that) is that the lack of real intentional-
ity would not make much difference if it became useful for us to treat AIs
as intentional systems in our daily lives. Indeed, if talk about AIs as
possessing intentions became a settled part of our way of speaking about
AIs, Searle's argument might come to be seen as a misunderstanding of
what we mean by "intentionality." If a lawyer brought up Searle's argu-
ment in a legal proceeding, some philosophers might say knowingly to
each other: "That argument is based on a mistake. Saying that an Al
knew where to find a bit of information is a paradigm case of intentional-
ity." Searle can respond by saying that this new way of talking certainly
does not reflect what he means by terms such as "intentionality," "know-
ing," and so forth, and he would be right. But what would be the argu-
ment that we should all continue to talk like Searle, long after there will
be any reason to do so?
Searle has an answer to this question. Take the example of con-
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sciousness rather than intentionality. We might have a reason to deny
that AIs possess the kind of consciousness that would count in favor of
giving them the rights of constitutional personhood, even though they
did a very good imitation of consciousness. Imagine that cognitive sci-
ence does develop a theory of human consciousness that is confirmed by
sufficient evidence, but someone produces an AI that is programmed to
produce only the recognizable symptoms174 (and not the real underlying
processes) of consciousness. In that case, we would have a good reason
not to treat the AI as a conscious being. If the illusion of consciousness
were a convincing one, we might lapse in our ordinary talk about AIs.
Moreover, if we built AIs that seemed conscious, got in the habit of treat-
ing them as if they were persons, and then discovered that what they
possessed was only a clever simulation of consciousness, we might be
quite shocked. Despite the possible shock, our knowledge about how
consciousness works would be very relevant and likely decisive for our
judgment as to whether an AI had it. Where Searle (or someone who
makes a similar argument) goes wrong, I think, is in his insistence that
we know enough about consciousness, intentionality, emotion, and free
will to rule out the possibility that it can be produced artificially by a
computer.
In sum, the two legal scenarios have several implications for the de-
bate over the possibility of artificial intelligence. First, focusing on con-
crete legal questions forces us to take a pragmatic view of the AI debate;
we are forced to consider what hangs on its outcome. Second, the trustee
scenario suggests that As will need to become very competent indeed
before we are tempted to treat them as possessing human-quality intelli-
gence suitable for use as a means to human ends. Third, questions about
true intentionality or real consciousness are not relevant to the inquiry in
the trustee scenario. Fourth, the constitutional personhood scenario sug-
gests that these questions about mental states will indeed be relevant if
we ask whether AIs ought to be treated as ends in themselves. Fifth, the
answer to the personhood question is likely to be found two places-in
our experience with AI and in our best theories about the underlying
mechanisms of the human mind.
Today, we lack both experience with really capable AIs and well-
confirmed theories of how the human mind works. Given these gaps,
Turing's suggestion that we put aside the question whether AIs can think
was a good one. Perhaps we have not put it far enough aside.
174. By symptoms, I mean the surface behaviors-those that could be observed without
examining the underlying mechanisms.
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VI. PERSONHOOD RECONSIDERED
Finally, I would like to raise some questions about the implications
of the AI debate for controversial questions in legal, moral, and political
theory. Cognitive science may provide us with a better understanding of
our concept of a person. Some of the most intractable questions in juris-
prudence, as in ethics and politics, have concerned the borderlines of sta-
tus-what is a person and why we do give human persons such strong
legal protection?175 Should animals have stronger legal rights? How
should we treat criminal defendants with multiple personalities?1 76 What
should be the legal status of a fetus? Should trees have standing? Many
of these questions remain unsettled. Disagreement about their proper
answers has persisted and even intensified.
It seems that developments in cognitive science might eventually be
brought to bear on some of these questions. For example, it could be
argued that personhood is identical with humanity-that possession of
the genetic material of homo sapiens is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for personhood. But cognitive science may give us a very different
picture of personhood-a picture that casts doubt on the equivalence be-
tween humans and persons. At the other end of the spectrum, Al re-
search might give us insight into the claim that groups have rights that
are not reducible to those of individuals.
Thinking about the question whether AIs should ever be made legal
persons does shed some light on the difficult questions the law faces
about the status of personhood. It is not that we have discovered a the-
ory of personhood that resolves hard questions about the borderlines of
status. Rather, thinking about personhood for AIs forces us to acknowl-
edge that we currently lack the resources to develop a fully satisfactory
theory of legal or moral personhood. 177 There are reasons for our uneasi-
ness about the hard cases at the borderline of status, and the thought
175. See GREENAWALT, supra note 109, at 120-43 (discussing the valuation of the life of a
fetus).
176. See Elyn R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 383 (1992).
177. In this sense, I do not think that considering the philosophical debate about the possi-
bility of Al yields any clear answers for current debates about personhood. But see Steven
Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death. Computers, Consciousness, and Nancy Cruzan, 43
STAN. L. REV. 659, 680 (1991). Goldberg has argued that artificial intelligence research may
shape the outcome of at least one legal question about the borderline of status-the definition
of death. He begins with the premise that humans have a strong preference for seeing the
human species as unique. He then argues that if a social consensus were reached that com-
puters are self-aware, we would then seek another characteristic of humans to distinguish our-
selves as unique in the universe. He suggests that this characteristic may be the capacity for
social interaction. Id. at 680. This leads Goldberg to the conclusion that self-aware computers
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experiment in which we have engaged can help us to get a firmer grasp
on these reasons.
The first reason for our uneasiness concerns the relationship be-
tween our concept of personhood and our concept of humanity. All of
the persons we have met have been humans, and the overwhelming ma-
jority have been normal humans who give clear behavioral evidence of
being conscious, having emotions, understanding meanings, and so forth.
Given this coincidence (in the narrow sense), it is not surprising that our
concept of person is fuzzy at the edges. For most practical purposes, this
fuzziness does not get in our way. We treat humans as persons, and we
need not worry about why we do so.
There are, however, occasions on which this strategy fails. Two of
the most prominent cases occur at the beginning and the end of human
life. Abortion and the cessation of life-sustaining treatment for humans
in permanent vegetative states both raise questions about the status of
personhood that cannot be answered by a simple comparison with a nor-
mal human adult. A third case is that of those higher mammals that
seem most likely to have a mental life that is similar to that of humans.
In these cases, we can see the second reason for the persistence of
uneasiness about the borderline of personhood. With respect to fetuses,
humans in vegetative states, and higher mammals, we lack the sort of
evidence we would need to establish a clear-cut case of personhood. Fe-
tuses and humans in permanent vegetative states do not behave as nor-
would make it more likely that courts would adopt capacity for social interaction as a defini-
tion for death. Id. at 681-82.
Goldberg's essay is provocative, but his argument is tenuous. First, Goldberg states but
does not argue for the assumption that "any concept of human death depends directly on those
qualities thought to make humans unique." Id. at 663 (citing ROBERT M. VEATCH, DEATH,
DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION: OUR LAST QUEST FOR RESPONSIBILITY 29-42
(1976)). Second, Goldberg asserts but does not provide evidence for the proposition that a
psychological need for humans to see themselves as unique caused the shift from heart-func-
tion to brain-function definitions of death. Id. at 660-70. Third, Goldberg does not consider
other possible chains of causation. Consider two other possibilities. One possibility is that
there may have been practical concerns for the cost of sustaining "life" without possibility of
recovery. A second possibility is that consciousness may be a condition of personhood, as
personhood is understood by the best available moral theory. The development of life-sus-
taining technology that permits the maintenance of heart function without consciousness for
extended periods may have forced the issue of how to define death, which would have only
been theoretical before the development of the new technology. Fourth, AIs that are capable
of producing consciousness also may be capable of social interaction. Therefore, the same
developments in artificial intelligence research that would prompt a move away from a con-
sciousness-based definition of death would also prompt a move away from a social-interaction
definition. Fifth, Goldberg's argument seems to imply that the move to a social-interaction
definition would be based on a conceptual mistake or some form of wishful thinking. But if
Goldberg can see this, why will courts be unable to do so?
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mal human adults do, but they are humans.17 Similarly, we have not
been able to communicate with higher mammals in a way that yields
clear behavioral evidence of a mental life of human quality, and higher
mammals like whales are clearly not humans. In none of these cases is
the behavioral evidence sufficient to establish that persons are (or are
not) present.
There is a third reason for our persistent doubts about the border-
line of personhood. Cognitive science, so far, has not yielded well-con-
firmed theories of the brain processes that underlie mental states like
consciousness, emotion, and so forth. Absent well-confirmed theories of
underlying processes, we cannot make confident judgments that the ele-
ments of personhood are lacking in particular cases.
Our thought experiment does suggest what sort of evidence might be
decisive. If AIs behaved the right way and if cognitive science confirmed
that the underlying processes producing these behaviors were relatively
similar to the processes of the human mind, we would have very good
reason to treat AIs as persons. Moreover, in a future in which we inter-
act with such AIs or with intelligent beings from other planets, we might
be forced to refine our concept of person.
The question then becomes what do we do about the hard cases that
arise today? Thoughts about the shape of an answer can begin with the
nature of justification and argumentation, both moral and legal. Our un-
reflective intuitions and well-considered moral and legal judgments are
rooted in particular cases. These paradigm cases are the stuff of ordinary
practical discourse. We make analogies to the familiar cases. We try to
bring order to our particular judgments by advancing more general theo-
ries. We seek reflective equilibrium between our considered judgments
and general theories. Ordinary practical discourse is shallow in the sense
that it can be (and usually is) limited to arguments rooted in our com-
mon sense and ordinary experience.
What do we do when we must decide a case that goes beyond these
shallow waters-the tranquil seas where theories are connected to the
ocean floor by familiar examples and strong intuitions? In deep and un-
charted waters, we are tempted to navigate by grand theories, grounded
on intuitions we pump from the wildest cases we can imagine. This sort
of speculation is well and good, if we recognize it for what it is-imagina-
tive theorizing. When it comes to real judges making decisions in real
legal cases, we hope for adjudicators that shun deep waters and recoil
178. Fetuses might have some behaviors that are associated with feeling, but they clearly
do not engage in behavior that establishes the concurrent presence of consciousness, intention-
ality, emotion, and free will.
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from grand theory. When it comes to our own moral lives, we try our
best to stay in shallow waters.179
The thought experiments in this Essay have taken us beyond the
shallow waters of our intuitions and considered judgments. One way of
expressing the result of our journey is this: Our theories of personhood
cannot provide an a priori chart for the deep waters at the borderlines of
status. An answer to the question whether artificial intelligences should
be granted some form of legal personhood cannot be given until our form
of life gives the question urgency. But when our daily encounters with
artificial intelligence do raise the question of personhood, they may
change our perspective about how the question is to be answered.
And so it must be with the hard questions we face today. Debates
about the borderlines of status-about abortion, about the termination of
medical treatment, and about rights for animals-will not be resolved by
deep theories or the intuitions generated by wildly imaginative hypotheti-
cals. Of course, many of us do believe in deep theories; we subscribe to a
variety of comprehensive philosophical or religious doctrines. But in a
modem, pluralist society, the disagreement about ultimate questions is
profound and persistent. Resolution of hard cases in the political and
judicial spheres requires the use of public reason. We have no realistic
alternative but to seek principled compromise based on our shared heri-
tage of toleration and respect. If there is no common ground on which to
build a theory of personhood that resolves a hard case, then judges must
fall back on the principle of respect for the rights of those who mutually
recognize one another as fellow citizens.
179. Compare John Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory, 48 PROC. & ADDRESSES
AM. PHIL. ASS'N 5 (1975) (arguing that moral theory should be independent of metaphysics)
with Robert Stem, The Relationship Between Moral Theory and Metaphysics, PROC. ARISTOT-
LIAN SOC'Y 143 (1992) (arguing that moral theory is dependent upon metaphysics).
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